# NEG Bilateral CP

### 1NC – NATO PIC

#### Counterplan:

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Albania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Slovakia, Greece, Slovenia, Hungary, Spain, Turkey, Latvia and North Macedonia in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.

#### Solves case – AND spills up as consensus develops over time

Németh 22 Bence Németh, lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Bilateralism and Minilateralism are Europe’s Secret Strengths,” War On The Rocks, 6-3-2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/bilateralism-and-minilateralism-are-europes-secret-strengths/> /GoGreen!

As a result of the war in Ukraine, policymakers in Europe and North America have scrambled to strengthen defense cooperation in Europe. The headlines inevitably focus on NATO and the European Union. Yet this ignores the reality of how European defense cooperation is actually established, fostered, and solidified. Indeed, the essence of defense cooperation in Europe is a web of hundreds of bilateral and minilateral collaborations. Often, NATO and the European Union work merely as a framework into which European countries upload their existing bi- and minilateral efforts.

To better enhance European defense, policymakers should appreciate the dynamics of these many collaborations. Taking advantage of the current circumstances to build more mini and bilateral ties, particularly where leadership and financial circumstances are most conducive, will strengthen Europe and make its multilateral institutions that much more formidable.

A History of Bilateralism and Minilateralism

In a few months, NATO countries have deployed thousands of troops and significant capabilities to enhance the defense of members on its eastern flank. In a stunning transition, two traditionally militarily non-aligned E.U. states, Sweden and Finland, re-evaluated their geostrategic position and submitted applications to join NATO. The debate about boosting the European Union’s “strategic autonomy” has become even more intense, and once again, member states are discussing coordinating their defense spending via joint procurements.

These vital initiatives could not work without existing, critical lower-level collaborations. For example, Russian military actions over the last several years in Ukraine prompted NATO’s eastern-flank allies to work swiftly together with their bi- and minilateral partners. The United Kingdom took on a leading role in Estonia, building on the close relations the two countries developed carrying out dangerous operations over a decade in Afghanistan’s Helmand province. Lithuania is a relevant defense market for Germany, and not surprisingly, the Bundeswehr leads NATO efforts there. Thanks to cultural similarity and extensive previous military cooperation, the Czech Republic has sent the most troops to Slovakia and oversees the international forces located there. For similar reasons, France deployed 500 troops to Romania. Such comparatively low-key actions were crucial in developing the necessary bottom-up relations, norms, and experiences upon which more recent grandiose announcements build.

Although Finland and Sweden intend to join NATO, they also found it essential to sign bilateral mutual security deals with the United Kingdom. This could happen quickly, mainly because Helsinki and Stockholm have built trust with London working together in the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force. The dynamics in the European Union are the same as in NATO. For example, in 2017, the European Union established the Permanent Structured Cooperation to strengthen defense cooperation among its member states after the Russian occupation in Crimea. However, most of its projects were based on existing bi- and minilateral defense initiatives, and the participating states often just rebranded them according to the new E.U. vocabulary.

The fact that existing bi- and minilateral relationships are the foundation of defense cooperation in Europe is not a new phenomenon. A survey of 70 examples of European defense collaboration highlighted that most have five or fewer participating states, and many are purely bilateral. These collaborations range from creating multinational units to cooperating on armaments, training, logistics, surveillance, operations, and/or command and control. More often than not, these collaborations are not part of NATO or the European Union, but they can be rebranded as E.U. and NATO projects quickly if it is necessary.

States can also use these collaborations to shape NATO and E.U. policies. For instance, the NATO operation in Libya in 2011 was basically an Anglo-French war, as France and Britain pushed for the intervention and took the brunt of the fight. They used NATO’s command structure to coordinate their war effort and the limited military support they gained from some NATO members helped fill their capability gaps. The background of this was a historical and overarching British-French bilateral defense agreement, the Lancaster House Treaties, which the leaders of the two European military powers signed a year earlier. The launch of the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy in 1999 also stemmed from a British-French bilateral agreement in St. Malo in 1998 as well.

Strengthening the Network

Improving NATO and E.U. defense cooperation requires looking under the hood to appreciate the role of these efforts. Scholars have already pointed out that Europeans must recognize the minilateral foundations of Europe’s security architecture. This corresponds with my experience as a former defense official. European ministries of defense do not always think in terms of institutions like the European Union and NATO. They have their own considerations, and they are using the framework that fits their goals the best, which can be NATO, the European Union, or smaller formats. Starting an initiative at this level is often more effective and can provide results more quickly.

As I argue in my newly published book, while these forms of cooperation are not new, their recent proliferation is unprecedented in Europe’s history. Furthermore, they provide the substance of practical military cooperation in Europe, which NATO and the European Union can build on. Thus, comprehending the dynamics behind them is crucial to foster effective defense cooperation moving forward. The research in my book indicates that when European nations start new defense collaborations, five structural and situational factors are important to achieve success.

#### BUT, shields NATO cohesion by avoiding the need for consensus upfront

Shapiro 9 Jeremy Shapiro, non-resident Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR; and Nick Witney, Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR; “Conflicted Europe,” Chapter 2, *Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations*, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2009, ISBN 978-1-906538-18-7, <https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ECFR19_TOWARDS_A_POST_AMERICAN_EUROPE_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-US_RELATIONS.pdf> /GoGreen!

In an effort to get beyond “mutual trust” and “consultations”, we asked our experts in each EU member state to tell us what they saw as the three most important issues in that state’s relationship with the US. The responses are tabulated at Annex 1. The lack of a common set of European priorities for the transatlantic relationship is well illustrated; the issues cited range across most regions of the world and also include global issues as diverse as climate change, democratisation, and nuclear non-proliferation. There is also a high incidence of “parochial” issues, especially for the smaller states (for example, Malta’s problem with illegal immigration), suggesting a tendency to look across the Atlantic for help on issues on which the EU seems to be of no help because it lacks either a remit or a consensus or both. Even when respondents cited the importance of “investment and trade”, they were actually referring to individual national interest; the collective EU interests that the Commission defends are seemingly so effectively delegated to the EU level that they slip out of national consciousness.

The big exception to this confusion of views and priorities is security and defence – listed among the top three issues by three-quarters of our respondents, and by many as the most important aspect of the transatlantic relationship. This preoccupation is by no means confined to those recently escaped from the Soviet empire; most western Europeans feel the same. Nearly all of our respondents judged bilateral counter-terrorism co-operation with the US to be close, productive, and largely immune to turbulence elsewhere.16 All regarded the continued engagement of the US in Europe’s defence as vital – with NATO, “the bedrock of our security” (see national defence white papers passim), as the key institution.

In general, therefore, European attitudes have evolved remarkably little over the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Our audit suggests that, despite the expansion and evolution of the EU and, in particular, the development of its external identity – despite, indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global diffusion of power – member states continue to think of the transatlantic relationship in terms of NATO and of bilateral relations. The Cold War dispensation, whereby the US offered Europeans security and the role of junior associates in running the world in exchange for European solidarity, remains deeply ingrained. Europeans seem essentially to want more of the same – especially now that there is a US president who Europeans can believe shares their own instincts.

How do they aim to get it?

This picture of a Europe preoccupied with the defence and security dimension of transatlantic relations, reluctant in consequence to do anything that might rock the boat, and determined to pursue its interests bilaterally rather than collectively is reinforced by our enquiries into the various assets and levers that different European states felt they were able to use in attempting to get what they wanted from Washington. The results are set out at Annex 2.

Once again, it is striking that the vast majority of assets or levers identified by our respondents relate to their role in diplomatic and especially defence and security co-operation with the US. Many member states believe that they have particular regional expertise or connections that Washington values; others list their readiness to promote democracy, especially in the eastern neighbourhood and the Caucasus. A majority point to their support for US military operations or the hosting of US military bases (10 member states support a continuing US military presence in Europe of some 70,000). One-third of EU member states even regard their geographical location as a key asset vis-à-vis the US. Beyond that, the other widely perceived asset is what we have termed “cultural links” – affinities of history or ethnicity which Europeans believe to have enduring political value. In short, Europeans aim to present themselves to the US as useful and attractive – and more so than their peers.

So one answer to the question of how Europeans seek to advance their transatlantic interests is: for defence, through NATO; for trade and competition issues, through the EU; and for almost everything else, bilaterally.

This preference for the bilateral track is more easily understood when it becomes clear how many of the European member states believe themselves to have some particular comparative advantage in dealing with Washington (see table below). The UK is not alone, or even in a minority, in cherishing the idea that its “special relationship’” is more advantageous than any collective European approach.17

### AT: Perm – Do CP

#### Perm: do counterplan – is severance – BOTH textually and functionally:

#### “With” requires NATO participation

Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, No Date, “With,” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/with> /GoGreen!

Definition of with

1 a: in opposition to : AGAINST

had a fight with his brother

b: so as to be separated or detached from

broke with her family

2 a—used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action, transaction, or arrangement

works with his father

a talk with a friend

got into an accident with the car

b—used as a function word to indicate the object of attention, behavior, or feeling

get tough with him

angry with her

#### “NATO” is exclusively its institutional organizations, NOT its member states

Johnston 19 Seth A. Johnston, Fellow of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, former chief of international security cooperation for intelligence at the U.S. Army Europe, former Task Force Commander in NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, PhD international relations, MA comparative politics, Oxford University, “NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan,” Parameters, The US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2019, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan> /GoGreen!

Today’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no Cold War alliance. Few developments illustrate NATO’s capacity for adaptation more than its 21st century role in Afghanistan.1 NATO allies invoked the collective defense provision—Article 5—of its founding treaty for the first and only time just one day after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.2 Few present at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 could have imagined it would be invoked by European countries and Canada seeking to support the United States or that the Alliance’s largest and longest military operation would occur in central Asia. Fewer still might have predicted NATO allies would agree to the mission so soon after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, a crisis the then US ambassador to NATO described as a “near death experience” for the Alliance.3 Yet NATO assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 and has remained in Afghanistan for the better part of two decades.

As the United States has begun negotiating a political settlement to the Afghanistan conflict with a view to the eventual withdrawal of international forces there, an assessment from the overall NATO perspective will complement the national initiatives.4 This effort will also support ongoing efforts to reassess NATO’s priorities in the face of other security challenges.5

Although NATO has undertaken formal studies of its activities in Afghanistan, recent scholarship by Heidi Hardt, Jörg Noll, and Sebastiaan Rietjens cast doubt on the efficacy of formal lessons learned processes in international organizations generally and in NATO specifically.6 This article offers an external and an unofficial assessment of the Alliance’s efforts and provides initial suppositions. In sum, NATO’s impact in Afghanistan may not have been enough to mitigate national shortcomings or to achieve victory on its own, but it was significant and positive. The Alliance’s adaptability and highly institutionalized character are at the root of these contributions.

Moreover, the mission in Afghanistan affected NATO in ways that promoted allied political cohesion, organizational effectiveness, and military interoperability. The chief implications of these findings are that while national political leadership and strategy formulation remain paramount in war, NATO remains a proven and effective instrument of organizing and implementing coordinated multinational efforts. The most important lesson learned from NATO in Afghanistan may therefore be about NATO’s more general value to the United States and other members.

NATO: Alliance and International Organization

In contrast to national assessments, this analysis focuses on the formal institutions of the Alliance. NATO is unique among alliances in that it is not only a treaty-based agreement among member states, but also an international organization—and a highly institutionalized one at that. Since its early years, NATO has been comprised of a permanently staffed formal political headquarters supported by a network of military and civilian organizations. Particularly noteworthy is NATO’s integrated joint multinational military structure, a unique innovation without equivalent among other alliances or international organizations.

This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise, the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare.

International relations theory would emphasize the formal institutions of NATO have very weak independent power and agency.

But although NATO consists of such formal institutions, the Alliance remains an alliance among states. All decisions at NATO Headquarters are taken by consensus among member states (which will soon number 30). Politics among those countries happens, and the relative influence of individual member states is closely associated with their power. NATO’s institutions matter chiefly because of how they facilitate and structure the relations among the states. Like any other international organization, states may derive value from such institutions because they provide benefits such as establishing predictable structures and routines for decision-making; increasing information sharing; improving efficiency and reducing transaction costs; and defining roles, status, and identity. The most important questions for NATO in the context of assessing its role in the Afghanistan conflict is whether and how well it has performed these functions.

#### Contextually, that makes the counterplan less than the plan

Tsuruoka 10 Michito Tsuruoka, Senior Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, “Japan–Europe Security Cooperation: How to “Use” NATO and the EU,” English translation from the original Japanese version with the same title published in Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo, 13(1), October 2010, <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2011/bulletin_e2011_3.pdf> /GoGreen!

The first section will examine the value of NATO as a security partner for Japan from the following four perspectives: 1) a political partner; 2) an operational partner; 3) as a means of cooperation with the US; and 4) a multilateral school. The second section will use a similar method to examine the significance of security cooperation with the EU, viewing it from the following three perspectives: 1) a political partner; 2) an operational partner; and 3) as a “non-American” partner.

There are two things to be mentioned before going into substantial discussions below. First, from the perspective of “mutually using the other,” it would be necessary to examine the value of Japan as a partner for Europe. However, it goes beyond the scope of this article, which is focused on the Japanese side of the story. That said, it needs to be mentioned that it is necessary for Japan to be prepared and willing to be used by Europe as long as Japan wants to use Europe and that letting Europeans understand the value of Japan as a partner is in Japan’s interest.

Second, this article focuses on cooperation with NATO and the EU; however, that by no means implies that security cooperation with individual countries such as the UK, France, and Germany is insignificant. For a long time, the majority of dialogue and cooperation between Japan and Europe in the areas of foreign policy, security, and defense have been conducted under bilateral frameworks with major European countries. As a result, the accumulation of knowledge and experience in Japan with regard to cooperation with NATO and the EU remain shallow compared to bilateral relations with individual countries. Against this backdrop, this article will focus on NATO and the EU.

1. NATO’s transformation and the development of Japan–NATO cooperation: How to use NATO9

(1) NATO as a political partner

From a Japanese perspective, NATO can be seen, first, as a political partner, meaning a partner with which to have political dialogue. When visiting NTO and addressing the North Atlantic Council (NAC), both Foreign Minister Taro Aso (May 2006) and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (January 2007) spent a great deal of time talking about the security environment in Asia, including the abduction and other issues of North Korea as well as China’s military buildup.10 Abe directly requested the understanding and support of NATO members concerning Japan’s stance on the North Korean abduction and other issues. This illustrates the fact that, for Japan, dialogue with NATO is a new venue to acquire understanding and support from Europe for its position on problems related to politics and security in Asia.

With regard to political and security dialogue between Japan and Europe, in addition to traditional bilateral frameworks between Japan and major European countries like the UK, France and Germany, there is now a channel between Japan and the EU (to be discussed later). Dialogue with NATO provides a new venue for discussion. In addition to Prime Minister and ministeriallevel visits to NATO (meetings with the NATO Secretary General and the NAC) and dialogue with the NATO Secretary General during his visits to Japan, at the officials’ level there is the annual Japan –NATO High-Level Consultation. Moreover, in addition to dialogue with NATO officials —the International Staff and the International Military Staff— ad hoc meetings are held from time to time between Japanese officials and representatives of the member states’ delegations to NATO in the context of the Political Committees (PC), Policy Cooperation Groups (PCG), and other frameworks depending on the topics to be discussed, such as the security situation in East Asia, Central Asia, and missile defense. In recent years, the NAC and the Secretary General have issued statements condemning North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, which Japan appreciates a lot, showing one aspect of NATO’s value as a political partner.11 NATO is a forum suitable for Japan to discuss Asian security and other security-related issues mainly because many security experts, both civilian and military, are assembled and deal with various security problems on a daily basis.

Japan is not alone in seeing NATO as a political partner. NATO is often described as the strongest and the most successful military alliance in history and encompassing all major powers from North America and Europe. Thus, NATO inevitably carries a unique weight in international security and world politics. That weight may even be heavier than NATO itself is aware.12 In fact, demand from non-members to conduct political dialogue with NATO has been increasing. At the same time, countries that do not necessarily have positive perceptions of NATO or that do not share fundamental values with the Alliance often see the strengthening of relations between NATO and non-members with concern and suspicion. For instance, Russia and China often react with vigilance when Japan and NATO cooperate. This partly comes from their genuine concerns over the strengthening of concrete military cooperation between Japan and NATO, but it also has to do with their recognition of NATO’s political weight. Moreover, these countries view Japan–EU and Japan –NATO cooperation differently. Put simply, they react more negatively to the latter than the former. This fact demonstrates that NATO carries a distinctive profile as a political actor that differs from that of the EU.

Nevertheless, it goes without saying that NATO is a military alliance based on collective defense. NATO is not supposed to be aiming to expand its political and diplomatic influence as a political actor in international relations. This is how NATO differs from the EU, which has been trying to construct a common foreign, security, and defense policy. At the same time, however, NATO is not an alliance that concerns military affairs alone. NATO has long labeled itself a politicalmilitary alliance, and even its founding North Atlantic Treaty emphasizes political and economic cooperation among the Allies (Parties).13

(2) NATO as an operational partner

NATO today can be characterized as an “alliance in action.” In addition to large-scale operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF), NATO is currently conducting an antiterrorism operation in the Mediterranean (OAE), antipiracy measures off the coast of Somalia, and a training mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Furthermore, from March to October 2011, NATO conducted an operation over Libya. Many non-NATO countries, as well as NATO Allies, are contributing troops to those operations and missions. In the case of ISAF, for instance, in addition to all of the 28 NATO countries, a total of around 20 non-members are participating as Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCNs). The presence of non-member contributors has grown considerably in the context of ISAF over the past several years.14 In the past, Australia and New Zealand had contributed troops to NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia, such as in Bosnia in the 1990s. However, the current level of non-members’ involvement in NATO-led operations is truly a new phenomenon. One reason behind this is the expansion of NATO’s operational commitments beyond the capacity of its members. In other words, it is impossible for the Alliance to conduct all the operations alone as a self-sufficient entity. At the same time, as most former communist countries in Europe have already become members of the Alliance, the weight of the countries outside the Euro–Atlantic region that used to be referred to as contact countries —Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, etc.— is increasing instead. From NATO’s point of view, cooperation with new partners is in essence an “import of support” 15 and NATO naturally welcomes countries with the will and capabilities to contribute to the operations that it leads.

On the other hand, operational cooperation with NATO is often an effective means for nonmembers in terms of enhancing their efforts in international peace and security, not least in the context of international peace operations. Most of these operations today are conducted multilaterally. What is more, looking at global trends in international peace operations, it is clear that the weight of United Nations-led peacekeeping operations (PKO) has been relatively decreasing in recent years. In its place is a growing presence of peace operations led by regional organizations such as NATO, the EU, and the African Union (AU).16 While the activities of the AU are limited to intra-regional operations on the African continent, NATO and EU operations (other than territorial defense mission by NATO) are basically assumed to take place outside of their member states.17

As a result of the expanding operational engagements of NATO and the EU outside of Europe, other countries including Japan often find themselves in a situation where they need to cooperate with NATO and the EU whether they like it or not. When the ISAF operation in Afghanistan was launched at the end of 2001, it was commanded on a half-year rotation by countries with the will and capacity to command. However, due to cost and complexities related to the establishment and maintenance of the headquarters, NATO took over command in August 2003.18 Furthermore, ISAF later expanded its area of responsibility and came to cover the whole country. As a result, those who were deploying troops in Afghanistan had no choice but to cooperate with NATO as long as they wanted to continue their engagement. Seen from a different angle, it can also be said that countries can use NATO as a framework through which to participate in international efforts. Without such a framework, small to medium-sized countries may not able to make contributions.

Nevertheless, there are various ways to pursue operational cooperation with NATO. Potential contributors could complete official procedures, including concluding a participation agreement with NATO, become a troop-contributing country, and then deploy troops under the ISAF command, or they could cooperate locally via individual arrangements made with other countries already active in the area (without having official relations with NATO).19 Theoretically, at least, it is even possible for those countries to conduct a completely independent operation on its own in Afghanistan. However, regardless of how self-contained the activities are, the necessity to coordinate on issues such as the division of roles with ISAF will of course come up, and it is practically impossible to assume that the countries that endeavor to send troops to Afghanistan could conduct its own activities without relying on the capabilities and various infrastructure of ISAF at all, including in extremis support and security information. Furthermore, even assuming it is feasible, it will not be the most efficient way to use the limited amount of resources available. In sum, it is not only in NATO’s interest, but also non-NATO troop contributors’ interest to cooperate with each other. Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer succinctly pointed out that, “NATO is a framework that they [nonmembers] can use to make their own efforts more effective.” 20 Furthermore, if a country completes official procedures with NATO and takes position as an official ISAF troop contributing nation, they can participate in various levels of ISAF meetings, receive more information, and get more involved in policy-shaping.

For a number of constitutional, legal and domestic political reasons, it is very difficult for the SDF to operate under the command of NATO.21 Short of coming under NATO’s command, however, various options are conceivable for the SDF to work with NATO in the areas where it operates. At the same time, operational cooperation with NATO does not need to be limited to the military domain alone. In Afghanistan, since 2007 Japan has provided humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in cooperation with PRTs, and since 2009 has dispatched development experts (civilian assistance teams) to the Lithuania-led PRT in Chaghcharan, Ghor province.22 Assistance from Japan was of great value for Lithuania, a country which does not have much funding and experience in development assistance. From a Japanese point of view, the importance of this scheme comes from the fact that it enables Japan to expand the geographical reach of its development assistance beyond those areas where an Embassy or the Japanese aid agency (JICA) are already present. Without the cooperation of the Lithuania-led PRT, it is easy to imagine that Japan would not have been able to operate in a remote province like Ghor. Moreover, Japan and NATO concluded a security agreement in June 2010, which allows Japan and NATO to share classified information with each other.23 This is expected to be a foundation for deeper dialogue and practical cooperation between Japan and NATO.24

(3) NATO as another venue of cooperation with the United States

The comparative advantage that cooperation with NATO offers Japan, as opposed to bilateral cooperation with major European countries and with the EU, is the fact that the US, Japan’s only formal ally, is part of NATO. For all NATO Allies excluding the US, what NATO means is essentially an alliance with the US. When NATO was founded within the context of the Cold War, it was primarily seen as a means to secure US commitment to defend Western Europe. Moreover, for former communist nations that joined NATO after the end of the Cold War, the NATO membership was synonymous with receiving a commitment from the US for collective defense, exemplified by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For those reasons, NATO is usually conceived in the context of policy toward the US in many countries.

#### Even if that’s not in the plan text, perms can be extra-topical but NOT non-topical

#### That’s best for debate:

#### 1 – limits – there are thousands of unpredictable unilat, bilat or minilat combination AFFs – each with unique, unpredictable advantages that demand targeted disads and counterplans

#### 2 – ground – all disads and “say no” case args depend upon the consensus requirement – forcing the AFF to cut ONE NATO key warrant is better than a year of vague, moving targets in which every DA is answered with “say no shields disagreement, or domestic politics, or Russian threat perceptions”

#### 3 – precision – consensus-based decisionmaking defines NATO – it’s unique and structures member relations – they divorce the topic from the literature

### AT: Perm – Do Both

#### Perm: do both – still links to the cohesion disad – only counterplan alone avoids getting bogged down by NATO’s consensus decision-making – that’s Shapiro

#### AND, holdouts are more likely to cave to pressure bilaterally

Jaeger 21 Dr. Markus Jaeger, Research Fellow in The Americas Program at German Council on Foreign Relations, “The Logic (and Grammar) of US Grand Strategy Implications for Germany and Europe,” DGAP Report, No.8, June 2021, <https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/210601_report-2021-08-en.pdf> /GoGreen!

As for security policy, the pressure on allies to shoulder a greater defense burden will initially increase given a diminished ability and willingness of US domestic interests to support overseas military commitments. The United States “economizes” its military power to extract economic advantages from its allies. Unlike in the realist scenario, this policy is primarily driven by domestic interests, not strategic considerations. As with economic policy, the United States has an increasing preference for dealing with its allies on a bilateral, rather than multilateral, basis, as this increases US leverage. To the extent that security guarantees are maintained, at least initially, allies will have to make economic and financial concessions – in terms of market access and resource transfers – in order to preserve US security commitments.

### AT: LTNB – Cohesion

#### Counterplan’s comparatively less likely to disrupt cohesion

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

With NATO’s attempts to create flexible, quasi-minilateral formats within its own partnership program failing to produce lasting results to this point, questions remain about what it can learn from the increased ad hoc approach to addressing various challenges. How does the rise of minilateral arrangements impact NATO, what makes them successful, and how can it apply the experiences of these various formats to its own partnership policy?

Minilateral or flexible arrangements can create adaptable options for engaging in political dialogue, missions, or operations—even for larger multilateral organizations. They are not as constrained by consensus rules or lengthy decision-making processes. Instead, they provide opportunities for the “willing and capable” to take swift action. As such, they fill an important readiness and political gap. They also create connections with key partners and across institutions to foster greater consensus and interoperability among Euro-Atlantic states.

#### Their ev’s acontextual – none of it says consensus-based decision-making is better – BUT increasing bilateralism now empirically proves it’s worse for cohesion

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

While NATO navigated the “new challenge – new format” issue, minilateral arrangements thrived in the Euro-Atlantic space, proliferating in the aftermath of defining security events, from the end of the Cold War to 9/11. They have gained new prominence throughout the last decade as NATO finds itself torn between competing priorities and struggles to balance territorial defense and external stabilization efforts. Differences in threat perceptions among members in Eastern and Southern Europe have added to this trend, as have internal political tensions and a growing desire for greater strategic autonomy among some European countries.

NATO’s eastern flank has been a particularly fertile landscape for minilateral formats. Events, from the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, created a new impetus to enhance deterrence, readiness, and exchange within and outside of NATO.

Newer regional initiatives built on longstanding cooperative efforts, such as the Nordic Baltic 8, a regional format for political consultations formally established in 2000 that engages Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden.

In 2009, the Nordic Defense Cooperation was launched as a collaborative and voluntary effort between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to strengthen these countries’ defense capabilities and strategic regional exchange. The Northern Group, which was established in 2010 by the United Kingdom as a forum to discuss common defense and security issues, has a wider geographical reach.8

The Bucharest 9, in contrast, is a minilateral format that includes all allies on NATO’s Eastern Flank— from Estonia in the North to Bulgaria in the South. Although it is independent of NATO, it is closely aligned with the alliance, with representatives meeting on the sidelines of NATO summits.9

Recent years have also seen a rise in broader ad hoc groupings among European nations that create capacity to respond to crises. In this regard, the French-driven European Intervention Initiative (EI2)10 received significant attention. It is a lean, relatively informal structure that aims to drive a common strategic culture among participating European nations. It is deliberately independent of NATO and the EU to create a high degree of flexibility. Besides France, EU member states Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Italy, are part of the initiative, as well as non-EU countries, Norway and the United Kingdom.

The EI2’s primary focus is exchange, collaboration, and planning to better position participating nations to act quickly in a crisis. Underscoring its agility, a joint statement by EI2 Defense Ministers published at their second ministerial meeting in 2019 describes the initiative as “a flexible, resource-neutral and non-binding forum, where all the Participants are equal.”11 And while members are not bound to participate in any operations, the format is designed to help prepare them to work together in potential future missions as part of NATO, the EU, UN, or other ad hoc groupings.

Part of the rationale for the EI2 initiative was the French Defense Ministry’s exasperation with time consuming and excessive consultations between NATO members in crisis situations—a conclusion colored by experiences including the 2013 intervention in Mali and the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks.12 The EI2 is designed to speed up this process by establishing a shared strategic culture that will make it possible to respond to crises more quickly. It enables European nations to set up groupings that can act swiftly and step in to act independently of larger institutions or lay the groundwork for larger operation overseen by the UN, NATO or the EU.

The EI2 underscores frustration with NATO’s consensus structure and the multi-body governance process of the EU. Both institutions are not known for quick decision making. As such, the EI2 could be an enabling asset in a crisis, but it also calls into question some of the core tasks assigned to NATO. Specifically, there are certain redundancies with other efforts, including some endorsed by NATO like the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (see further below). Moreover, it remains to be seen if significant divergences between the EI2 members in terms of strategic cultures – including their willingness to engage in conflict13 – can really produce any successes absent the larger institutional momentum provided by an organization like NATO or the EU once they achieve consensus.

The EI2 was launched in the wake of French disappointments with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was established in 2017 to jointly develop defense capabilities within the EU. Although PESCO is part of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, participation is voluntary and is open to those “capable and willing.”14 The degree of integration became a sticking point for this format. For instance, France envisioned a selective initiative with more capable EU member states, leading to a leaner structure and a greater level of ambition.15 Ultimately, Germany’s vision of a more inclusive model prevailed with all but two EU member states (Denmark and Malta) joining PESCO. In contrast, the EI2’s “small, but mighty” scope is more in line with President Emmanuel Macron’s vision of European leadership.

### AT: Deficit – Generic / Multilat Key

#### No deficits:

#### 1 – sufficiency framing – compare to the squo, NOT the plan – all security coop with NATO members has always been bilateral – it can’t be that bad – AND examples of activities that seem multilateral only proves coordination in planning zeroes any deficit in practice

O’Mahony 22 Angela O’Mahony, associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND, former assistant professor of international political economy and economic statecraft at the University of British Columbia, PhD political science, UCSD; David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jennifer D. P. Moroney, senior political scientist at RAND, PhD international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury; Jason H. Campbell, policy researcher at RAND, former country director for Afghanistan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, PhD war studies, King's College London; Rachel Tecott, Assistant Professor, U.S. Naval War College, PhD Political Science, Security Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Mary Kate Adgie, research assistant at RAND; “Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies,” RRA641-1, RAND Corporation, 2022, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA600/RRA641-1/RAND_RRA641-1.pdf> /GoGreen!

Establishing Shared Standards and Procedures

The United States and its allies prioritize establishing shared standards and procedures to ensure that they have the ability to coordinate effectively in a potential conflict. Liaisons and personnel exchanges provide a way to sustain enduring relationships between U.S. and allied militaries. The United States conducts SC activities on a bilateral basis, engaging allies in liaison and military personnel exchange programs. The United Kingdom has as many as 15 liaison officers and 13 exchange officers placed in Army commands. These officers have the opportunity to share information on operational procedures, which helps build and sustain long-term interoperability between the two armies.19

Defense and military contacts, which are more short-term, also provide a means for sharing information. The contacts include army-to-army staff talks and key leader and senior leader engagements. According to G-TSCMIS, Australia and the United Kingdom have the highest number of SC engagements among highly capable partners, including planning conferences, bilateral and multilateral coordination meetings, and staff talks; the majority of these engagements are focused on interoperability.

Multilateral engagements and such organizations as NATO and ABCANZ provide mechanisms for developing shared standards for the United States and its allies. NATO Standardization Agreements, for example, provide the basis for developing common operational and administrative procedures and logistics that enable one NATO country to operate with and support another member’s military forces. ABCANZ focuses on developing common standards for the land forces of the highly capable allies. Regional working groups have also developed in recent years to serve as an institutional mechanism to share information. Together, they have become part of an emerging SC planning process initiated by the United States and its highly capable allies.

#### 2 – all of their advantage scenarios necessarily involve unilateral capabilities and organizations – there’s no terminal impact to any deficit

Obering 8 Lieutenant General Henry Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; Lieutenant General Kevin Campbell, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command; and Mr. Paul Francis of the Government Accounting Office; questioned by John P. Murtha, U.S. Representative (D-PA), Chairman of the House Appropriations’ Defense Subcommittee; “DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009,” hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 110 Congress, 2-26-2008, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg46474/html/CHRG-110hhrg46474.htm> /GoGreen!

Question. Several NATO allies have expressed concern about the Administration's decision to deploy missile defense on a bilateral basis (i.e., with Poland and the Czech Republic) rather than through a NATO process.

Why did the Administration decide to move forward on a bilateral instead of a multilateral process with NATO?

Answer. Forces operating under NATO auspices are not typically NATO assets but force/capability contributions made by NATO members. This is the common model that the U.S. has chosen to follow for the European Deployment. We held significant discussions with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners on a way forward to strengthen Trans- Atlantic unity and improve protection for all NATO countries against longer-range missile threats.

#### 3 – informally access every NATO key warrant – by selectively utilizing NATO resources while remaining formally independent

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

The 2014 Wales Summit then gave rise to other options. Members endorsed the Framework Nations Concept (FNC), proposed by Germany in 2013, as a viable flexible format within NATO. Voluntary and bottom-up, this approach enables individual NATO members—or framework nations—to work with a limited set of other members to fill critical capability and operational gaps. The FNC model creates more formal groupings and commitment among the participants than the +N model. Against the backdrop of strained defense budgets and varying threat perceptions, it was designed to combine the limited resources of large and small European members while decreasing redundancies. The concept builds on those of NATO’s “Smart Defense” and the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing,” taking a step further by creating a more structured, coordinated approach focused on outputs and measuring success against national capability targets set in NATO’s Defense Planning Process.

Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, as larger and more capable “framework nations,” head separate FNC initiatives. Although these differ quite significantly, there is a common denominator: they are voluntary, multinational frameworks led by members focused on furthering NATO’s mission. They may often rely on the alliance’s organizational and command structure, yet they remain independent of its operational structures. And all three have been expanded to include non-NATO countries, serving as an important link between the alliance and its partners.

Given that participation of and consensus among all NATO members is not required, the FNC initiatives provide greater flexibility. Focusing on capability development, the German-led FNC group has taken a more inclusive approach with 21 members and partners participating in a variety of working groups or clusters.16 The FNC groups led by Italy and the United Kingdom are more selective, building on each countries’ specific expertise in crisis management and military readiness. The Italian group,17 which is the least developed at this point, focuses on multinational formations, operations, and potential capability development.18 Meanwhile, the United Kingdom used the FNC as an opportunity to reinvigorate its efforts to create a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a multinational high-readiness force with the participation of Nordic, Baltic, and Western European countries.

#### 4 – spills-up to formal NATO action – path-dependencies and perception that multilat’s fraught makes uptake more likely by starting bottom-up

--MDC = multinational defense cooperation

--DPC = defense policy community

Németh 22 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “How to Achieve Defence Cooperation in Europe,” Chapter 9, *How to Achieve Defence Cooperation in Europe? The Subregional Approach*, Bristol University Press, 2022, ISBN 978-1-5292-0945-7, pp.151-158 /GoGreen!

Dynamics between the structural and situational factors: the theoretical model This book argues that certain structural and situational factors are necessary to establish a new defence cooperation in Europe. Structural factors are understood as institutions, solid and long-standing relationships, trends and perceptions that had been developed for a relatively long period. Normally, they create the wider conditions for collaborations but they cannot trigger the launch of new MDCs per se. Situational factors relate to the political and economic environment, personal relationships that might change relatively quickly. These elements create a situation that provide favourable circumstances and a window of opportunity to establish a new defence collaboration.

The structural factors are:

1) the existence of the European security community;

2) the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence;

3) previous defence collaborations between the participating states.

The situational factors are:

1) strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them;

2) a supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation.

Figure 9.1: Uploading and downloading policies between the different levels of MDCs in Europe

Table

Description automatically generated

The dynamics between these factors can be explained by two figures. Figure 9.1 shows how the subregional level processes interact with the first structural factor: the existence of the European security community. Figure 9.2 highlights what happens on the subregional level regarding the other two structural and two situational factors.

Figure 9.1 points out that the existence of the European security community has an impact on the subregional level and that developments on the subregional level can have an impact on the European-level security processes. This structural factor is the most relevant precondition for creating MDCs in Europe because the members of the European security community do not intend to solve their problems militarily with each other, as they share similar identities, perceive their interests similarly and understand the concept of security in the same way. This created an environment in Europe where cooperation instead of confrontation has become the dominant trait in military affairs in the European security community. Furthermore, through institutionalized security cooperation in NATO and the EU, different DPCs create new shared meanings (for example, concepts, approaches, policies) in this community by uploading their approaches from the subregional to the European level. And DPCs also download shared meanings from the European level to the subregional level when they learn them socially through different transactions and communications. This can be seen in Figure 9.1 which shows that NATO and EU processes influence the subregional level and vice versa. This also means that only NATO and/or EU members are part of this security community and it does not include every European country.

Figure 9.2 explains the dynamics on the subregional level, which is at the bottom of Figure 9.1. Accordingly, Figure 9.2 highlights how the remaining four factors interact with each other on the subregional level regarding the DPC of one country. When we analyse the creation of a defence collaboration, we have to analyse the most relevant DPCs in the studied defence collaboration.

Figure 9.2 looks like an hourglass where the ‘sand’ of the two structural factors related to previous defence collaborations and perception about the defence budgets slowly trickles down, creating ‘options’ for defence cooperation on the bottom part of the hourglass. Based on this, the studied DPC, which sits in the middle of the hourglass, has several available options (circles) for defence collaborations with other DPCs of the European security community. However, the ‘potential options’ (black circles), which are based on stronger previous partnerships and similar perceptions about their defence budgets of two or more DPCs, will be likely realized if the situational factors are in place. These situational factors work as filters that retain certain potential options from ‘falling down’ to the bottom of the hourglass and this way they can become defence collaborations. The filters created by the situational factors can stop only ‘potential options’ as they are more robust. However, when the situational factors related to ‘personal relationships’ and the ‘political milieu’ are not properly in line, they cannot work as filters and even the ‘potential options’ fall down and none of the options will become an MDC.

Figure 9.2: Interaction of the factors in defence cooperation in Europe

**[Figure 9.2 OMITTED]**

On the top half of the hourglass, the structural factor of ‘the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence’ reflects the widely shared view among DPCs that, in general, European militaries do not have enough funds to have every military capability they need. These perceived scarce budgetary resources can be mitigated by cooperation. However, as we saw in Chapter 5, DPCs do not necessarily create new collaborations because of a budgetary famine as happened after the 2008 financial crisis. In such crisis situations, they focus on themselves instead of looking for new collaborations and do not have the resources to cooperate. Rather, the long-term perception of the lack of resources is the key element for them in cooperation. The other structural factor points out that previous defence collaborations create path-dependencies and thus there is a bigger chance that a new MDC will be established among existing partners. The four self-reinforcing mechanisms incentivize the already collaborating DPCs to stay or expand their defence cooperation further. First, the already invested set-up costs in the form of collaborative frameworks, agreements and practical cooperation urge the DPCs to continue working together. Second, during the collaboration process, they also learn to cooperate with each other more effectively, which is called learning effects. When they start to benefit from coordinating their activities with other DPCs in the form of coordination effects, it also reinforces existing collaborations instead of replacing them with totally new ones. Finally, adaptive expectations come into play when DPCs believe that the cooperation that has worked in the past will work in the future too, so they are willing to invest more into them.

These two structural factors related to previous defence collaborations and perceptions about the defence budget have been evolving slowly and creating options for collaborations for DPCs. These options can be seen on the bottom half of the hourglass in Figure 9.2. In principle, a DPC can establish a new MDC with any other DPC in the European security community with which it had a certain level of defence cooperation in the past and perceive the inadequacy of its defence budget similarly to the other DPC.1 These are the available options. However, some options have a better chance to be materialized because of deeper partnerships between DPCs in the past and more similar views about their defence budgets. These are the potential options. If the situational factors are in place, they work as filters and stop these potential options falling down in the ‘hourglass’ and trigger the creation of an MDC.

One of these situational factors is the ‘strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them’. Without actual people, structures per se will not establish new collaborations, meaning that at least two leaders have to work actively on launching the MDC. These stakeholders usually like each other and this interpersonal attraction helps them to work together more effortlessly. Scholarship in psychology highlights that propinquity and similarity are key in developing interpersonal attraction. Propinquity is crucial because it is almost impossible to develop interpersonal attraction without a chance of coming in contact with a person. If people regularly interact, in most cases, they start to like each other more. This happens thanks to the mere exposure effect which explains that, as a result of increased engagement with someone or something, they become familiar to us and become more predictable and less threatening. In the case of creating MDCs, the propinquity is often established through several official meetings in different settings. Although propinquity can help to develop a relationship to a certain extent, similarity between individuals in relevant areas also plays a crucial role. If two people are similar to each other in terms of their attitudes, experience, social class and so on, they can better understand each other, build trust faster and their communication becomes more effortless and straightforward.

The other situational factor is the ‘supportive political milieu towards subregional multinational defence cooperation’. This is relevant because, although the structural factors and the situational factor of strong leadership and interpersonal chemistry between the leaders might be present, without the supportive political milieu, the leaders would work in a political vacuum and could not launch a new MDC successfully. The political milieu works on two levels: on the microenvironment and the macroenvironment. The microenvironment is where the discourse and the policy formulation about possible military cooperation happens inside a DPC and between relevant DPCs. The macroenvironment can be understood as the events and relationship patterns that are significant to get support for creating the MDC from outside the DPCs. The relationships between the events of the microenvironment and macroenvironment are dynamic. Occasionally, the macroenvironment is supportive towards certain MDCs, but sometimes the DPCs in the microenvironment intend to shape their macroenvironment to get support for launching a new defence collaboration. In this context, the DPCs are making sense, telling stories and naming certain issues to frame policies based on the interactions between the micro and macroenvironments of the political milieu.

Based on these structural and situational factors and the model that is describing the dynamics between them in Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2, we can analyse how and why certain MDCs are created. The next sections of this chapter will briefly explain the launch of the Lancaster House Treaties, the NORDEFCO and CEDC, applying this model and using the insights of the previous chapters. The Lancaster House Treaties The Lancaster House Treaties between France and the UK were signed by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, on 2 November 2010. In the treaties, the two DPCs agreed on cooperating on several areas such as capability development and procurement, defence industry, research and development, common deployments, nuclear deterrents and so on.

One of the reasons why the French and British DPCs pushed for this defence cooperation was that they were dissatisfied with the developments at the European level. They were highly influential in shaping the shared meanings of the European security community as they often uploaded their approaches, concepts and policies to the EU and NATO (Figure 9.1). For instance, together they launched the ESDP in the late 1990s and regularly pushed for new initiatives either alone with others. However, towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s, both DPCs were disillusioned with NATO and EU processes. The British DPC had been mostly dissatisfied with the contribution of European DPCs to military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the low level of defence budgets of European armed forces. The members of the British DPC were very vocal about these issues and concluded that practical bilateral cooperation with partners who possess similar military capabilities was a better option than large multinational solutions. France was an obvious option for this and the French reintegration to the NATO’s military wing in 2009 made the collaboration even easier. The French DPC had a similarly negative view about EU level processes, but as Paris invested more into EU-level military cooperation than in NATO partnerships its dissatisfaction was mostly about the lack of progress in EU defence. Partially, this disillusionment about the EU was the reason why France reintegrated into NATO’s military wing in 2009 and also looked for practical cooperation with credible partners such as the UK. Thus, these European-level processes (reluctant allies to contribute to defence efforts in NATO and EU and French reintegration to NATO) had a significant impact on the thinking of the British and French DPCs on the subregional level.

In terms of the second structural factor, the British DPC had ‘the perception that it had not appropriate funds’ for achieving all of its goals and the reluctance of European allies to share the burden made Britain frustrated. At the same time, the large defence budget cuts that the British MoD suffered after the 2008 financial crisis did not incentivize the British DPC to look for alternative multinational solutions to maintain some of its capabilities. The MoD rather focused on national solutions by cutting back capabilities and commitments. The French Armed Forces did not immediately suffer from big defence budget cuts as its British counterpart did, but several military equipment programmes were slowed down and delayed significantly. However, the financial crisis did not trigger the French DPC to look for multinational solutions either. In the cases of the French and British DPCs, rather, the long-standing trend of the eroding of the value of the defence budget contributed to the idea that strengthening the cooperation with already existing pragmatic partners was desirable.

The British and French DPCs had worked together for decades on defence before the Lancaster House Treaties, highlighting the third structural factor (previous collaborations) which is often necessary for creating a new MDC. They invested the large set-up costs by establishing cooperative frameworks and agreements already in place from the 1970s and 1980s. As they started to cooperate more, they experienced the learning and coordinating effects by learning to work together more effectively and also experienced the benefits from their cooperation. As in the 1990s, these processes led to adaptive expectations, namely the British and French DPCs holding the belief that their cooperation could work in the future too. Thanks to these developments, the French and British DPCs established plenty of defence collaborations on different levels after the end of the Cold War that created even more path-dependencies for them.

Thus, the structural factors about the perception to the lack of funds for defence and the previous defence cooperation between the French and British DPCs created a ‘potential option’ for collaboration (Figure 9.2). Although this ‘potential option’ existed previously, the presence of the two situational factors was needed for the launch of the Lancaster House Treaties. The first situational factor was that the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, showed strong leadership and had interpersonal chemistry. This relationship was built through experiencing the mere exposure effect through repeated interactions in official and semi-official meetings bilaterally and in multinational settings. In addition, they were similar in relevant aspects, which helped them to develop interpersonal attraction quickly. First, they belonged to the same political family, which was very unique for an incumbent British Prime Minister and French President, as it was the case for only two years in the 21st century so far. Second, Sarkozy was much more pro-UK and pro-US than his predecessors. Thus, he was seen as someone who was more similar to Western political leaders, which made it easier for Cameron to accept and trust Sarkozy.

The second situational factor was the positive political milieu towards this MDC. In the microenvironment (the level of the DPCs), the French and British DPCs were supportive for deeper pragmatic collaborations with each other. Thanks to their aforementioned dissatisfactions in the NATO and EU-level processes, France’s reintegration to NATO, the perception of lack of funding and decades-long British–French defence cooperation, they saw the potential for a new, deeper collaboration between them in a positive light. The macroenvironments of the two DPCs were their domestic political environments where leading politicians intended to use the Lancaster House Treaties for mostly domestic, political purposes and framed-related policy decisions. The British Prime Minister intended to demonstrate to the Eurosceptic wing of the Tory party that he could cooperate with other European countries outside the EU successfully. At the same time, Sarkozy needed to show France’s domestic audience and its European partners that France was proactive and a leading nation in defence after the ESDP stalled. Although certain differences emerged in the French and British policy discourse regarding the Lancaster House Treaties, essentially, the French and British DPCs had similar approaches. They emphasized the commonalities between their countries while ignoring their differences to gain support.

As shown, the dynamics concerning the five factors fostered the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties. Namely, the British and French DPCs were frustrated with the developments on the European-level defence collaborations in the EU and NATO, perceiving that, in general, they did not receive enough resources to fund themselves properly. This led to the conclusion for both DPCs that they needed to strengthen existing pragmatic partnerships instead of focusing on large multinational solutions in the EU and NATO. As the French and British DPCs cooperated for decades before the Lancaster House Treaties, existing path-dependencies pushed them to work even more closely together, creating a potential option for a new MDC. This potential option was materialized in the Lancaster House Treaties. The fact that Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron liked each other helped them to easily work together and, for different reasons, the political milieu in both countries were supportive towards this new MDC.

### AT: Deficit – AT: Thaler

#### Their Thaler ev – and lack of explicit authorization for multilat SC – is irrelevant – counterplan fiats the same programs with the same countries as the plan

#### AND, he admits it’s NOT a deal-breaker – planners stretch authority all the time

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf> /GoGreen!

Similarly, authorities that restrict activities to specific mission areas are seen as inflexible in the face of quickly emerging threats, making it difficult to build partner capacity in intended mission areas and further impelling SC personnel to “game” the system to achieve their SC objectives. After 2001 and until recently, the priority for U.S. national security strategy and for SC (and DoD activity in particular) has been counterterrorism.24 Congress established Section 1206 and many other recent SC authorities on the basis of the need to rapidly respond (and help partners respond) to threats from al-Qaeda and more recently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). But as the CT mission area has been addressed in the past ten to 15 years, other missions have emerged that are becoming priorities for the United States and its partners but that are not explicitly covered under the CT rubric (or under “stability operations,” another area addressed in authorities). These other emerging areas include cyber warfare and “hybrid” warfare of the type Russia has utilized to subjugate eastern Ukraine and annex Crimea (gaps are also addressed in a subsequent section of this chapter). Capstone DoD strategic planning guidance that defines priorities and directs the efforts of the CCMDs also identifies nontraditional threats, such as transnational border security, maritime security, and foreign fighters.25 While Congress and the administration have created some specific programs to bolster Ukraine and eastern NATO allies,26 existing authorities do not provide the flexibility for SC personnel to pursue these mission areas in other nations or regions. Thus, they are left with “stretching” existing authorities to achieve key objectives with partners.27

### AT: Deficit – XT: All SC Is Bilat

#### There is no such thing as multilat SC – their solvency advocates all mean the counterplan, NOT the plan

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf> /GoGreen!

Three other limitations or gaps have been raised in numerous discussions with SC personnel in DoD. We indicated above that DoD has been limited in some authorities to working only with foreign forces associated with national defense agencies. Emerging transnational threats and mission areas require the ability to work with interior agency forces or other gendarme or civil authorities when their security forces retain primary responsibility for those mission areas or operate in close collaboration with MoDs. For example, in many cases, the ministry or department of interior is responsible for securing national infrastructure and cyber assets; of six countries CENTCOM officials are engaging on infrastructure security, only in Jordan is the military responsible for protecting the country’s infrastructure.66

A second gap in Title 10 authorities is in the flexibility for DoD to work with regional organizations rather than just bilaterally with national governments. Under Title 10, even regional programs (such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund [CTPF]) are implemented bilaterally with national governments. There are no mechanisms for training and equipping regional organizations.67 When this limitation is combined with the limitation on U.S. military engagement with non-MoD security forces, it inhibits the U.S. ability to facilitate coordination among agencies with similar responsibilities within and across partners to have regional effects and to address local security threats.68

#### Coordination in planning achieves multilat effects

--UCC = Unified Combatant Command(er) (ex. USEUCOM, the people who make Theater Security Cooperation Plans)

Szayna 4 Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; Adam Grissom, senior political scientist at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, senior political scientist and former manager of the International and Security Policy Group at RAND; Thomas-Durell Young, Brian Rosen, and Yuna Huh, research assistants at RAND; “U.S. Army Security Cooperation Toward Improved Planning and Management,” RAND Corporation, 2004, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA426628.pdf> /GoGreen!

Security Assistance Training. In the case of certain kinds of security assistance training, the demanders believe that the demand exceeds by a large margin the available seats in U.S. Army schoolhouses and the funding available for International Military Education and Training.7 According to the interviewees, in some cases demand exceeds supply to such an extent that the shortfalls have affected the overall UCC theater security cooperation strategies. Contractors were cited as one possible solution, but only as a suboptimal last resort.

Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) play an important role in the management of security assistance training.8

**[FOOTNOTE 8]**

8 In the European theater, ODCs and Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) are now combined and called Bilateral Assistance Offices (BAOs).

**[/FOOTNOTE 8]**

ODC chiefs, in close coordination with the country team, develop security assistance country plans with their host nation counterparts and are therefore a key determinant of demand. The country plans are provided to the UCC and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for review, and eventually they are integrated into the UCC's overall security cooperation planning process.

### AT: Deficit – Undermines NATO

#### No trade-off – bilats do NOT snowball, they’re continually calibrated to optimize complementarity – AND current bilats thump or disprove

Hindrén 22 Rasmus Hindrén, Head of International Relations at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, “What Finland will bring to NATO – and how it might change the alliance,” Breaking Defense, 5-19-2022, <https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/what-finland-will-bring-to-nato-and-how-it-might-change-the-alliance/> /GoGreen!

Other defense cooperation structures, like JEF and strategic bilateral partnerships can support interoperability and developing new capabilities, but they might also offer flexible mechanisms for responding to crises where NATO as a whole would be unwilling or unable to act. On the other hand, there might be pressure to downscale some of the other elements of defense cooperation in the fear that they would be too duplicative or forcing Finland to spread its efforts too thin. In the end, Finland would calibrate its network of defense cooperation in the way that adds most value.

One area where bilateral cooperation will not drop off, however, is very clear. Every country in NATO cherishes their bilateral defense cooperation with the US and Finland would not be an exception. Finland would want to continue and deepen that bilateral cooperation, while understanding the longer-term trends of strategic competition will force the United States to focus its gaze more on the Indo-Pacific region.

When it comes to multilateral decision-making, as a general rule Finland avoids situations where it is politically isolated or even in a small minority. In multilateral fora that often means a forceful support to an emerging consensus. In substance terms, this would likely include underlining the role of the transatlantic relationship but balancing it with a regional and European approach.

Another natural path would be to focus heavily on cooperation with neighboring countries like Norway and, naturally, Sweden; in fact, with all five Nordic nations in the alliance, a greater NATO focus on the high north would seem likely to emerge.

Multilateralism is likely to stick: Two key strands of Finnish security and defense policy would likely be continued in NATO: a focus on bilateral and minilateral defense cooperation mechanisms and support to the EU’s evolving security and defense policy.

Although it was hesitant until the around the time of the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, Finland has been a strong proponent of the EU defense policy ever since. This has been partially motivated by Finland being outside NATO but, more importantly, by the understanding that the EU is a broad security community with a sizeable toolbox of policies and capabilities. There are longstanding tensions between the EU and NATO on defense issues; as the newest alliance members, and hence high-profile, it is possible Sweden and Finland could play a role in bridging that gap.

#### All their offense links to the status quo – the root cause is NATO’s consensus requirement, NOT the counterplan

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

Roadblocks to Rethinking Partnerships

While the need for NATO to adapt its partnership model for today’s challenges has been detailed, there are several significant hurdles to any reform effort. First, institutions are slow to change and NATO is certainly not immune to this dynamic. NATO’s consensus-based approach to decision making only exacerbates this—allowing one member of an increasingly diverse alliance to block the action of the other 29 given related or unrelated political reasons. This puts any transformation in NATO’s partnership policy at the mercy of complicated political and institutional dynamics. Unfortunately, the more “hostage taking” policy-making or lowest-common-denominator thinking persists in alliance realities, the less likely it is going to be the institution of first resort for partners (and members). To avoid this, members and partners may opt for the second “bottom-up” approach advocated above. A more informal initiation that docks into NATO rather than formally overseen by NATO could prove its utility to the alliance’s strategic priorities and play on NATO flexibility through the +N format.

Second, NATO’s ability to adapt and set out a more ambitious, organizationally driven partnership policy is hampered by its own staffing bandwidth. NATO international staff are already responsible for a broad spectrum of activities across the organization’s core tasks. As such, a more flexible model following the parameters of the FNC may prove useful. While NATO officials should play a role in driving the key issues framing the partnership clusters, the real burden of organizing political dialogue and capacity building could be offloaded to the lead nations under the auspices of NATO. This would allow for an institution-driven approach without posing too heavy a burden for the already understaffed organization.

Third, the lessons learned from failed expectations around various partnership frameworks or mechanisms have resulted in aversion to assembling new ones. As the partnership menu has grown and various outdated mechanisms have accrued, thinking beyond bilateral or trilateral ad hoc groupings is seen as outmoded. It will take a creative and ambitious approach to combine NATO’s more flexible +N tendencies with a broader and more deliberate partnership strategy to various interest-based issues that NATO leadership and key members need to tackle together.

Finally, political leadership within the alliance has been critical in moving discussions forward when institutional jams occur. This role has mostly fallen to the United States. But recent years have increased doubts as to whether the United States will, or should, continue to play the same role it has in the past. Recent unilateral U.S. foreign policy decisions like the decision to withdraw troops from Germany have eroded trust in the United States as a reliable partner among some members. While President Joe Biden has already indicated a return to treaty-based alliance politics, growing demands facing the United States in other regions, including the Indo-Pacific, as well as at home, will continue to focus policymakers attention and divert resources from the Euro-Atlantic space. A continued absence of strong leadership that can serve as a unifying force within the alliance when political cohesion issues arise will be detrimental to moving any ambitious reforms forward, including NATO partnerships.

Given this, NATO members other than the United States will have to play a greater leadership role in the alliance and help to drive issues that align with their security interests in cooperation with partners. Moreover, if NATO partnerships are to stay relevant for all members, including the United States, a more global outlook is inevitable. This is a clear principle guiding the NATO 2030 effort.

Conclusion

Partnerships have been a core component of NATO’s work to strengthen transatlantic security and defense since the end of the Cold War. But as the security environment changed, its partnership policy increasingly lagged. Large and bulky partnership mechanisms are no longer as useful as they once were and NATO’s success in creating a more flexible approach to partnerships has been limited, often engaging only bilaterally or trilaterally, while other efforts have lost momentum. Such inefficiencies in leveraging partnerships are an opportunity lost for members and partners.

### AT: Deficit – Norm-Setting

#### Counterplan’s ability to set effective norms is indistinct from the broader solvency debate – if we win the counterplan has greater scope for cooperation, then we necessarily also win better norm-setting

Tirkey 21 Aarshi Tirkey, Associate Fellow with Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme, “Minilateralism: Weighing the Prospects for Cooperation and Governance,” ORF Issue Briefs and Special Reports, 9-1-2021, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/minilateralism-weighing-prospects-cooperation-governance/> /GoGreen!

Discussions on new areas of concern, such as critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity and supply chain resilience, could lead to the devising of new norms between a select group of countries. New sectors and issues particularly related to 5G, digital trade, ocean acidification, climate change and climate finance, are being increasingly discussed in minilateral platforms. While the norms discussed may be applicable only to the members of a minilateral grouping, they can point to an emerging consensus on the form and substance of new regulations. However, there is also a concern that such norms may become fragmented, lack consistency, and rather contribute to a weakening of global governance in the long run. The future impact of minilaterals—or multilaterals and global governance—will be based on their ability to foster cooperation and collaboration on international issues, rather than leading to a fragmentation of global governance mechanisms.

### AT: Deficit – Interoperability

#### Solves their links to interoperability

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

With NATO’s attempts to create flexible, quasi-minilateral formats within its own partnership program failing to produce lasting results to this point, questions remain about what it can learn from the increased ad hoc approach to addressing various challenges. How does the rise of minilateral arrangements impact NATO, what makes them successful, and how can it apply the experiences of these various formats to its own partnership policy?

Minilateral or flexible arrangements can create adaptable options for engaging in political dialogue, missions, or operations—even for larger multilateral organizations. They are not as constrained by consensus rules or lengthy decision-making processes. Instead, they provide opportunities for the “willing and capable” to take swift action. As such, they fill an important readiness and political gap. They also create connections with key partners and across institutions to foster greater consensus and interoperability among Euro-Atlantic states.

#### BUT, even if they’re right, fragmentation is net better for interoperability in their impact scenarios

Hura 2K Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, Eric Laron, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Dan Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin O’Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison, RAND Project Air Force, “Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations,” 2000, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1235/RAND_MR1235.pdf> /GoGreen!

Although participation in coalition operations has varied greatly from situation to situation and over time (see Table A.4), a number of allies have been particularly reliable in their participation in recent coalitions in which the United States has also participated.

As shown in Table A.4, the most frequent NATO coalition partners in the 40 operations examined were the United Kingdom (29 of 40 operations), France (28), Turkey (23), Germany (22), and Italy and the Netherlands (21 each). Other NATO allies participated in fewer actions with the United States.

[Table A.2 OMITTED]

The implications are twofold. The first is that interoperability planning must be adaptive enough to accommodate the possibility of coalitions of different sizes and composed of different coalition partners. “Plug-and-play” is a concept that is well known at the technological level. But it is also required at the national level to provide for the possibility of different combinations of coalition partners; to manage the comings and goings of coalition members as the mission focus changes and/or missions are added, completed, or abandoned; and to minimize disruptions to the overall coalition effort. This suggests a focus on long-term interoperability solutions, including organizations, doctrine, procedures, and system architectures that can accommodate the dynamic character of coalitions, including transitions.

[Table A.3 OMITTED]

The second implication is that because the United States’ NATO allies vary in their coalition participation with the United States, the United States might be able to achieve important interoperability through a series of bilateral rather than alliance-wide efforts.

### AT: Deficit – Political Sustainability

#### CP’s more sustainable – bypassing NATO’s consensus requirement is key to prevent the US from giving up and going home

Jermalavičius 11 Tomas Jermalavičius and Anthony Lawrence, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia, “From the Cold War and Hot Peace to the Long War and Beyond: What Are Our Armed Forces (Good) For?” Annual Baltic Conference on Defence, Summary 2011, <https://abcd.icds.ee/2011-3/summary-2/> /GoGreen!

“Smart defence” or more “pooling and sharing” and better burden sharing could provide a way to increase collective capabilities even while spending is declining. This is not an entirely new way of thinking if defined it as the sum of all cooperative efforts and initiatives within the EU and NATO, rather than just as common ownership of assets and capabilities. Initiatives such as cooperative capability, security cooperation, mutual development or multinational formations such as Eurocorps – all designed to increase the capacity of the military to work together – have existed for a long time. New initiatives such as NATO’s strategic airlift consortium further advance this thinking and practice. We are already witnessing the dividends of these approaches in operations in Afghanistan. Certainly, there are many areas where this must be taken further and produce more – all very well illustrated by capability gaps in operations in Libya: air-to-air refuelling, ISTAR, combat SAR, tactical airlift etc. It does not matter through what sort of arrangement or under which nation’s lead this is delivered, as long as it is actually delivered rather than producing the very modest results of many past initiatives (DCI, PCC etc.) or projects (e.g. helicopter initiative in NATO). Civilian capabilities will also have to be enhanced through cooperative efforts such as the Weimar initiative, since the management of many contemporary crises requires civilian inputs.

Prompted by the crisis, we often talk about spending on new capabilities such as cyber, but this cannot become a substitute for investing in real capabilities (cyber would have been of little use in Libya or against the Taliban) and doing it in a collective, coordinated manner. New approaches are needed to obtain those capabilities, especially doing away with many duplicate programmes in Europe. In the United States, despite the inherent waste of a large defence organisation, the military manage to derive a greater value from their investments than the Europeans. If Europeans continue in their current approach of just shrinking their “total war” force instead of reconfiguring it properly for the age of “limited wars”, the Americans will simply turn away and leave. Their executive branch and the military realise very well that even the United States cannot achieve everything alone and must cooperate with its allies and partners in Europe, but this may not arrest the growing sentiment of giving up on Europe felt in the legislative branch. On the other hand, some of the fault for the capability gaps and the steep decline in conventional heavy capabilities in Europe rests with the United States: many Europeans wanted to shine in the “coalitions of the willing” led by the Americans and therefore developed capabilities which bought influence instead of producing military effectiveness.

“Pooling and sharing” will work best if it comes in a “bottom up”, pragmatic fashion – much in the way of the recent UK-France defence cooperation agreements – and if they are linked with U.S. capabilities. Indeed, it is likely that most of the workable arrangements will be bilateral and multi-bilateral rather than genuinely multilateral. “Pooling and sharing” has its limits, some of which arise from the difficulties encountered in agreeing upon and then implementing decisions in a consensus-based decision-making culture in organisations such as NATO and the EU. More fundamentally, however, diverging strategic cultures in Europe mean that there is no common threat perception and no common understanding of why and in what circumstances the use of military force is necessary and appropriate, which may render “pooled and shared” assets and capabilities unusable. There are interventionist countries keen on using force to advance interests and values, and those who exercise extreme caution and would reserve the use of force for the defence of the Alliance‘s territory. (This was illustrated by the challenges of reaching a common position with regard to NATO’s intervention in Libya.)

### Solvency – AI

#### It’s better suited to SC in AI in particular

Stanley-Lockman 21 Zoe Stanley-Lockman, analyst researching military innovation, emerging technologies, and defense cooperation, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, “Military AI Cooperation Toolbox: Modernizing Defense Science and Technology Partnerships for the Digital Age,” CSET Issue Brief, August 2021https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Military-AI-Cooperation-Toolbox.pdf /GoGreen!

Bilateral Military AI Agreements and Cooperative S&T Blueprints

Whereas the two tools above consist of structured opportunities for military AI cooperation, a host of other initiatives offer additional useful ways forward on military AI cooperation. The selection here focuses on bilateral AI agreements that create linkages to foreign national security innovation bases, as well as pathways that do not yet orient toward AI but could with only minor adjustments.

Bilateral Military AI Cooperation Agreements

DOD already has many project arrangements that create ad hoc cooperation opportunities with defense technology communities in other countries, but only a small number of recent initiatives target new forms of military AI cooperation. 55 This section focuses on two such formats, one with Singapore and the other with the U.K. Military AI collaboration is already taking place. The JAIC technology collaboration with the Singapore Defence Science and Technology Agency, agreed in June 2019, is different from other AI-related project arrangements in that it names a specific area of cooperation, and is not necessarily service-specific.56 This collaboration focuses on the mutual operational interest of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, a relatively noncontroversial area.57 This echoes calls from several analysts to begin international military AI cooperation with lower stakes and the possibility to scale into larger initiatives.58

The centralization of AI efforts in the JAIC may portend an eventual hub-and-spokes model for cooperation. This is because its location and reporting structure in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) could promote coordination with the military departments to either work across combatant commands or cut across operational domains. Further, the coordinating role played by the JAIC could make the cooperation more visible and easier to assess as a blueprint for other countries. On this note, it could be seen as a pilot not just for U.S.-Singaporean collaboration, but also as an inspiration for similar efforts with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, which are under-represented in the toolbox here.

With the U.K., the Bilateral Academic Research Initiative (BARI), launched in 2018, focuses on creating academic collaborations. More specifically, this collaboration could take the form of grants and fellowships on AI research. With the inaugural pilot program selected to focus on human-machine teaming, DOD and the U.K. Ministry of Defence will respectively sponsor up to $3 million and £1.5 million for the multidisciplinary, academic team to conduct the “high-risk basic research as a bilateral academic collaboration.”59 Notably, while the allies with the same level of intelligence access as the U.K. are numbered, the broader academic and scientific focus of the BARI pilot could be replicable for basic and applied research with many more countries willing and able to co-fund these ventures.

The flexibility of these forms of collaboration is overall a strength. That said, for both examples here, the military AI collaboration projects fit into existing, overarching frameworks of cooperation, as declared by the heads of state or defense minister counterparts.60 Without these broader frameworks, similar working-level relationships may be seen as ad hoc.

Cooperative S&T Blueprints

Whereas the above bilateral cooperation agreements are already oriented toward AI, the defense technology cooperation tools discussed below could be integrated into the toolbox for AI, but have not yet done so.

One example of such S&T blueprints is the Allied Prototyping Initiative. Launched in 2019 by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD/R&E), the Initiative funds a small number of cooperative operational prototypes related to the top DOD modernization priorities. Under the Initiative, the United States can identify transition pathways for operational capabilities in the five- to seven-year horizon, including future codevelopment with the U.S. national security innovation ecosystem.61 So far, the program has funded prototypes for highspeed propulsion technologies with Norway and hypersonic vehicles with Australia.62 But given its focus on DOD technology modernization priorities, the Initiative can also oversee prototyping related to AI and machine learning, autonomy, microelectronics, and fully networked command, control, and communications.63

Building on existing international cooperation agreements such as IT&E agreements, future Allied Prototyping Initiative project arrangements can help further identify the extent of TEVV and technology transition funding focused on AI-enabled and autonomous systems. In fact, it may be better suited for this task than the longer-standing, counterpart program, Foreign Comparative Testing.

Another small, regional agreement that can serve as a blueprint for AI cooperation is the Polar Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation arrangement between the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden.64 Just as this agreement is based on a “shared desire for strong cooperative relationships that preserve safe, stable and secure Polar regions,” other minilateral arrangements—such as the Quad—could use this as a blueprint to align R&D and TEVV priorities with a free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.65

### Solvency – Cybersecurity

#### It solves cybersecurity cooperation better

Housen-Couriel 22 Deborah Housen-Couriel, Chief Legal Officer and Vice-President Regulation for Konfidas Digital Ltd., a cyber and data protection consulting firm, member of the International Group of Experts that drafted the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on state activity in cyberspace, teaches cyber law and policy and serves on the Advisory Board of the Hebrew University Law School’s Cyber Security Research Center, research fellow with the Reichman University’s Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya’s Institute for Counter-Terrorism, MPA-MC Harvard Kennedy School, LLB, LLM the Law School of Hebrew University, “3 - Information Sharing as a Critical Best Practice for the Sustainability of Cyber Peace,” Chapter 3, *Cyber Peace: Charting a Path Toward a Sustainable, Stable, and Secure Cyberspace*, eds. Shackelford, Douzet & Ankersen, Cambridge University Press, April 2022, ISBN:9781108954341 /GoGreen!

Building on previous chapters that treat the concept of cyber peace in depth, the following definition focuses on four specific elements:

Cyber peace is […] not […] the absence of conflict […]. Rather it is the construction of a network of multilevel regimes that promote global, just and sustainable cybersecurity by clarifying the rules of the road for companies and countries alike to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict, crime and espionage to levels comparable to other business and national security risks. To achieve this goal, a new approach to cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from the public and private sectors to build robust, secure systems and couches cybersecurity within the larger debate on internet governance.

(Shackelford, 2014, pp. xxv–xxvi)

The four elements emphasized in the above definition describe the fundamental connection between the goals of cyber peace and information sharing (IS), the subject of this chapter (Johnson et al., 2016, p. iii).Footnote1 Clarification of “rules of the road,” whether these are binding or voluntary; threat reduction, risk assessment, and best practices for carrying out these three tasks are precisely the substantive contribution that IS makes to the cybersecurity postures and strategies of stakeholders participating in any given IS platform. As detailed herein, such a platform optimally defines threshold norms of permissible and nonpermissible online behavior on the part of all actors, establishing the criteria for determining whether an individual, private organization, country, group of hackers, or even another autonomously acting computer has violated a rule (Deljoo et al., 2018, p. 1508). It also reduces vulnerability to cyber threats by lessening the informational asymmetries that characterize hostile cyber activities to the advantage of the attacker, and contributes to organizational risk assessment by integrating the information shared by other participants in the IS community into heightened “cyber situational awareness” for all sharers. Fourth, IS is readily framed and understood by a multiplicity of actors at the domestic level – private, governmental, and individual – as a best practice and, at the international level, as a confidence-building measure (CBM) for building trust among state and nonstate actors.Footnote2 These two characterizations of IS in the domestic and international jurisdictional arenas, respectively, are evidenced by the inclusion of IS modalities in many instances of national law and policy, as well as tens of multilateral and bilateral instruments for governing cyberspace at the international level (Housen-Couriel, 2017, pp. 46–84). Five examples of the latter are the 2015 Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s International Code of Conduct for Information Security, the UN GGE Report of July 2015, the OSCE’s Confidence-Building Measures for Cyberspace of 2016, the EU’s Network and Information Security Directive that entered into force in August 2016; and the 2018 Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace.

When IS implemented as a voluntary or recommended best practice or CBM in the context of these regulatory arrangements – rather than as a mandated regulatory requirement – it has the advantage of bypassing the legal challenges of achieving formal and substantive multistakeholder agreement on cyber norms. The difficulties of such normative barriers are often observed as characteristic of the contemporary cyber lay of the land. Either as a best practice (at the domestic level) or a CBM at the international level, IS has the advantage of bypassing the present challenges of achieving formal and substantive multistakeholder agreement on cyber norms that are inherent elements of national and multilateral legal regimes for the governance of cyberspace (Macak, 2016; Ruhl et al., 2020).

We propose in this chapter that, as IS platforms provide increasingly relevant, timely, and actionable data on vulnerabilities, including zero-day vulnerabilities (Ablon & Bogart, 2017); adversaries’ tactics, techniques, and procedures; malware tool configurations; and other tactical and strategic threat indicators, stakeholders will become more incentivized to increasingly trust IS platforms and to utilize them for both real-time response to hostile cyber activities and for building long-term cybersecurity strategies. Technological advances are easing this process, as platforms adopt new techniques for the automation of alerts and communications among sharers (Wagner et al., 2019). Thus, in instances when sharing communities are substantively and technologically optimized for cybersecurity, participants benefit from expertise and insights which may otherwise be unavailable to them with respect to developing threat vectors, mitigation of specific cyber risks, and real-time coordinated responses to hostile cyber events.

### AT: T/N – Bilats Bad – Generic

#### ZERO uniqueness for the turn – all of their evidence is describing the status quo, NOT the counterplan

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

The Evolution of NATO Partnerships

After the Cold War, NATO’s strategic focus shifted away from territorial defense toward external crisis management and out-of-area operations. This first played out in the Balkans and later in the Middle East and North Africa. Meanwhile, NATO enlarged as countries in Eastern Europe joined the alliance while others joined partnership frameworks. These partnerships played an important role in NATO’s mission to buttress democracy and security in Europe in the 1990s. They also advanced its mission to project stability in the Middle East and Africa.

Today, NATO boasts a robust menu of partnership formats and mechanisms. Some—including the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP)1 and the corresponding European-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue2 — date back to the 1990s. Others, like the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,3 were shaped by NATO’s growing focus on issues like counterterrorism in the 2000s. The involvement of a broad set of countries in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan gave rise to a new category of partners labeled Partners across the Globe, which were emphasized by the Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010.4

While the EAPC (a forum for PfP countries), the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative were envisioned as multilateral formats, the tools developed in the PfP itself prioritize bilateral cooperation and are open to all NATO partners.5 In 2014, NATO launched the Partnership Interoperability Initiative to improve the quality of partners’ contributions to NATO-led operations, missions, and exercises. Within this framework, the Enhanced Opportunities Partnerships program offers additional pathways for cooperation to six countries: Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine. Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia also all have separate and additional frameworks for dialogue and cooperation through the NATO-Georgia Commission, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the NATO-Russia Council.

NATO’s latest partnership effort has been dubbed One Partner, One Plan. Although it is still in development, its aim would be to streamline activities with respective partner countries. As this initiative evolves, it remains to be seen how it will impact other partnership mechanisms or partnerships more broadly. There are concerns it could lead to further bilateralization of partnerships as well as one-size-fits all approaches that provide less flexibility for the partner country.

Despite this impressive list, NATO’s partnership mechanisms are not currently achieving their full potential and are due for a rethink. Many major issues are being neglected. This is not to say that partners no longer play a role in NATO’s operations and priorities. On the contrary, some—such as Sweden and Finland— are about as closely integrated in NATO’s planning as they could possibly be short of membership. But, as is also true with Georgia and Ukraine, most of these activities take place in bilateral or trilateral formats, although these countries are also part of other, larger partnership frameworks.

This reality reveals some flaws in NATO’s partnership policy. There are not only redundancies, but many of the broader frameworks have lost momentum and purpose. Many formats lack clear processes and goals, lumping together diverse groups of nations that have very different hopes and expectations in how they engage with NATO. In addition, formats like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which aim to catalyze broader cooperation beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area, continue to fall short of their intended purpose and lack a clear agenda for the future. While these frameworks demonstrate their usefulness by building political ties and space for dialogue, they are less effective when it comes to driving actual outcomes that benefit NATO’s interests or strategy, or those of its partner countries.

NATO tends to create new formats as the security environment changes without first conducting a serious stocktaking and reformation of existing partnerships mechanisms—a process that has traditionally **[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]** been extremely partner driven. This “principle of new challenge – new format”6 creates a buildup of barely used, somewhat irrelevant, or effectively defunct mechanisms. On paper, there seems to be broad partnership engagement, but in practice little is produced. This puts into question the utility and purpose of NATO partnerships for all parties concerned.

The hodge-podge of partnership formats suggests a serious need for greater strategic and institutional drive on the part of NATO. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan was a slight turning point in this regard. Here, NATO played a crucial role in driving the integration of partners—giving rise to a more strategic and reciprocal approach to partnerships, with NATO not only assessing what it “can do for its partners,” but “what partners can do for [NATO].”7 Despite this shift, most partnerships going beyond specific missions are still very much driven by partner initiative and shaped by partner interests. This creates inefficiencies and fails to maximize partners’ contributions, which could be a huge asset to NATO in the face of several emerging global challenges.

Minilateral Approaches to Security

While NATO navigated the “new challenge – new format” issue, minilateral arrangements thrived in the Euro-Atlantic space, proliferating in the aftermath of defining security events, from the end of the Cold War to 9/11. They have gained new prominence throughout the last decade as NATO finds itself torn between competing priorities and struggles to balance territorial defense and external stabilization efforts. Differences in threat perceptions among members in Eastern and Southern Europe have added to this trend, as have internal political tensions and a growing desire for greater strategic autonomy among some European countries.

NATO’s eastern flank has been a particularly fertile landscape for minilateral formats. Events, from the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, created a new impetus to enhance deterrence, readiness, and exchange within and outside of NATO.

Newer regional initiatives built on longstanding cooperative efforts, such as the Nordic Baltic 8, a regional format for political consultations formally established in 2000 that engages Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden.

In 2009, the Nordic Defense Cooperation was launched as a collaborative and voluntary effort between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to strengthen these countries’ defense capabilities and strategic regional exchange. The Northern Group, which was established in 2010 by the United Kingdom as a forum to discuss common defense and security issues, has a wider geographical reach.8

The Bucharest 9, in contrast, is a minilateral format that includes all allies on NATO’s Eastern Flank— from Estonia in the North to Bulgaria in the South. Although it is independent of NATO, it is closely aligned with the alliance, with representatives meeting on the sidelines of NATO summits.9

Recent years have also seen a rise in broader ad hoc groupings among European nations that create capacity to respond to crises. In this regard, the French-driven European Intervention Initiative (EI2)10 received significant attention. It is a lean, relatively informal structure that aims to drive a common strategic culture among participating European nations. It is deliberately independent of NATO and the EU to create a high degree of flexibility. Besides France, EU member states Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Italy, are part of the initiative, as well as non-EU countries, Norway and the United Kingdom.

The EI2’s primary focus is exchange, collaboration, and planning to better position participating nations to act quickly in a crisis. Underscoring its agility, a joint statement by EI2 Defense Ministers published at their second ministerial meeting in 2019 describes the initiative as “a flexible, resource-neutral and non-binding forum, where all the Participants are equal.”11 And while members are not bound to participate in any operations, the format is designed to help prepare them to work together in potential future missions as part of NATO, the EU, UN, or other ad hoc groupings.

Part of the rationale for the EI2 initiative was the French Defense Ministry’s exasperation with time consuming and excessive consultations between NATO members in crisis situations—a conclusion colored by experiences including the 2013 intervention in Mali and the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks.12 The EI2 is designed to speed up this process by establishing a shared strategic culture that will make it possible to respond to crises more quickly. It enables European nations to set up groupings that can act swiftly and step in to act independently of larger institutions or lay the groundwork for larger operation overseen by the UN, NATO or the EU.

The EI2 underscores frustration with NATO’s consensus structure and the multi-body governance process of the EU. Both institutions are not known for quick decision making. As such, the EI2 could be an enabling asset in a crisis, but it also calls into question some of the core tasks assigned to NATO. Specifically, there are certain redundancies with other efforts, including some endorsed by NATO like the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (see further below). Moreover, it remains to be seen if significant divergences between the EI2 members in terms of strategic cultures – including their willingness to engage in conflict13 – can really produce any successes absent the larger institutional momentum provided by an organization like NATO or the EU once they achieve consensus.

The EI2 was launched in the wake of French disappointments with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was established in 2017 to jointly develop defense capabilities within the EU. Although PESCO is part of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, participation is voluntary and is open to those “capable and willing.”14 The degree of integration became a sticking point for this format. For instance, France envisioned a selective initiative with more capable EU member states, leading to a leaner structure and a greater level of ambition.15 Ultimately, Germany’s vision of a more inclusive model prevailed with all but two EU member states (Denmark and Malta) joining PESCO. In contrast, the EI2’s “small, but mighty” scope is more in line with President Emmanuel Macron’s vision of European leadership.

A picture containing text, outdoor, screenshot

Description automatically generated

Although PESCO is an initiative driven by EU members and so far no third states have joined, it is a format embedded within the EU that allows third states to participate if they are invited by the participating members. Progress has been less ambitious than originally envisioned in this treaty-based format, in part due to a lack of sufficient funding.

#### Bilateralization is NOT going to change – especially post-Afghanistan

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

Surveying the evolution of NATO partnerships reveals several important takeaways. First, the era of doing big things with several partners across the alliance has largely come to a halt, at least for the time being. Absent a significant investment of energy to revive efforts like the European-Atlantic Partnership Council (which faces nearly intractable political hurdles and has not produced anything of substance since its policy for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2014)28 or to consider new ways to engage a broad range of partners, it is hard to see how this dynamic will change. NATO’s increasing tendency to engage with a more limited set of partners confirms that broader frameworks are no longer the preferred approach. If successfully implemented, NATO’s plans to streamline its partnership agenda under “One Partner, One Plan” may continue the trend of bilateralizing relationships with partner countries without facilitating broader networks of partner engagement.

Even NATO’s more recent mission-driven partnership efforts, like the Enhanced Opportunities Partnerships program (EOP), are running out of steam as members and partners consider winding down the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. The EOP has successfully deepened integration and interoperability of its six partners with NATO forces. But post-Afghanistan, it will be little more than a conglomeration of heterogenous partners that are more interoperable with NATO but are clearly guided by varying motivations. Georgia and Ukraine hope to ultimately join the alliance. Finland and Sweden want to be more interoperable to contribute to NATO efforts in line with their own defense and security concerns. For Australia and Jordan, it is about connecting to an institution that gives the opportunity for cooperation with a broad spectrum of nations in the Euro-Atlantic space. In the near-term, NATO is unlikely to undertake new out-of-area missions, particularly with increased reluctance of the United States to engage militarily. Translating the EOP into a broader flexible engagement is extremely unlikely given the varying political calculations of its participants. As a result, it is difficult to see how its successes can be carried forward, again reinforcing the need to think in new terms about the contours of NATO partnerships.

### AT: T/N – Bilats Bad – Miscalc

#### It reduces risk of miscalc

Cottey 2K Andrew Cottey, Lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, and Department of History, University College Cork, “Europe's new subregionalism,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 23(2), 2000, pp.23-47, DOI 10.1080/01402390008437789 /GoGreen!

From the Barents and the Baltic Sea in the north, through Central Europe and the Balkans, to the Black Sea in the south a range of new subregional groups and cooperation processes have emerged in Europe during the 1990s. Compared to NATO and the European Union, these new subregional groups have received little attention. Their 'indirect approach' to security, however, plays an important role in overcoming the legacy of the Cold War, reducing the risks of military conflict and addressing nonmilitary security challenges. As NATO and the EU expand eastwards, subregionalism is assuming growing importance as a means of avoiding new 'dividing lines' in Europe. After the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, subregionalism is also gaining importance as a means of building cooperation in South-Eastern Europe. The challenge for the future is to give more substance and depth to Europe's new subregional cooperation frameworks.

Stretching from the Barents and the Baltic Sea in the north, through Central Europe and the Balkans, to the Black Sea in the south a range of new subregional groups and cooperation processes have emerged in Europe since the end of the Cold War.1

In Northern Europe these subregional cooperation initiatives now include the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), a new security dimension to cooperation among the five Nordic states, cooperation among the three Baltic states, 'five-plus-three' cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states and the far northern Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC).2

In Central Europe they include the Visegrad group, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the Central European Initiative (CEI). In South-Eastern Europe there is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and, since the 1995 Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia, the Balkan Conference initiated by the countries of the subregion, the EU's Royaumont Process and the United States-led Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). In the wake of the 1999 war in Kosovo, the international community has also established a new Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe to promote cooperation in the Balkans. Europe's new subregional groups now span the whole of the region that was the heart of the Cold War East-West division of the continent.

Despite their relatively low profile compared to Europe's larger security organisations, particularly NATO and the European Union (EU), these new subregional cooperation groups are making a significant and growing contribution to European security. By bringing together Western and Eastern European states the new subregional groups are helping to erase the Cold War division of the continent and establish new patterns of cooperation.

Subregional groups also provide important frameworks for addressing the growing agenda of 'soft' security challenges in areas such as democratisation, human and minority rights, economics, the environment and transnational crime. Indeed, these groups follow what may be described as the 'indirect approach' to security: they do not deal with traditional security issues (the balance of power, alliances, military power) or the direct sources of conflicts, but rather facilitate high level political contacts, lower level 'people-to-people' ties and cooperation in addressing non- or 'soft' security issues - with the implicit objective of building confidence between states and societies and providing a basis for longer term peaceful relations.3

In the context of NATO's and the EU's enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe and after the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, there is growing interest in subregional cooperation. Subregional frameworks such as the Visegrad group, CEFTA, the CBSS and the new Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe are viewed as means of facilitating Central and Eastern European states' integration with NATO and the EU by establishing patterns of cooperation with NATO/EU and helping states to adopt the NATO/EU 'acquis' of political, economic and military standards.

Perhaps even more importantly, subregional groups also provide important means of avoiding a new division of Europe as a result of the eastward enlargement of NATO and the EU. By bringing together longstanding NATO/EU members, 'first wave' new members, other Central and Eastern European states who will have to wait some time before they join NATO or the EU and those states outside the enlargement process and wary of its consequences (particularly Russia and Ukraine), subregional groups provide frameworks for sustaining and deepening cooperation across the potential dividing lines of the new Europe.

After the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, further, subregionalism is assuming growing importance as a means of promoting democratisation, economic reconstruction, conflict resolution and cooperation among the countries of South-Eastern Europe. As a result of these developments, Western governments are giving increasing support to subregional cooperation and NATO and the EU are developing new subregional dimensions to their eastern outreach policies.

As Europe faces the challenge of NATO and EU enlargement and continuing instability in the Balkans, subregionalism has a potentially important role to play in sustaining cooperation on NATO/EU's eastern borders, promoting democracy and economic reform, addressing new 'soft' security challenges and preventing future conflicts. The challenge for the future will be to give more substance and depth to the existing subregional frameworks, making subregional cooperation a central part of Europe's new order alongside NATO and the EU.

# AFF AT: Bilateral CP

### Perm: Do CP – 2AC

#### Perm: do counterplan

#### “With” only requires association, not participation

Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, No Date, “With,” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/with> /GoGreen!

Definition of with

1 a: in opposition to : AGAINST

had a fight with his brother

b: so as to be separated or detached from

broke with her family

2 a—used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action, transaction, or arrangement

works with his father

a talk with a friend

got into an accident with the car

b—used as a function word to indicate the object of attention, behavior, or feeling

get tough with him

angry with her

c: in respect to : so far as concerns

on friendly terms with all nations

#### “NATO” refers to member countries – the “North Atlantic Council” is the institution

Masters 22 Jonathan Masters, Deputy Managing Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, MA social theory, the New School, BA political science, Emory University, “What Is NATO?” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, last updated 5-4-2022, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-nato> /GoGreen!

Established during the Cold War, NATO is a transatlantic security alliance composed of thirty member countries, including the United States.

NATO has focused on deterring Russian aggression in recent years, but it has also conducted security operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Somalia.

Amid Russia’s 2022 offensive in Ukraine, many NATO allies are providing Kyiv with extraordinary quantities of military supplies, and the alliance could expand to include Finland and Sweden.

Introduction

Founded in 1949 as a bulwark against Soviet aggression, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the pillar of U.S.-Europe military cooperation. An expanding bloc of NATO allies has taken on a broad range of missions since the close of the Cold War, many well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, in countries such as Afghanistan and Libya.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, a nonmember, in early 2022 has shaken Europe’s security architecture and prompted a major reevaluation of NATO members’ foreign policies and defense commitments. The threat from Russia has generated the greatest tensions with the alliance in the post-Cold War era. It is driving up defense spending and pushing some longtime NATO partners, namely Finland and Sweden, to seek formal membership, which would mark another historic expansion of the alliance.

A Post–Cold War Pivot

After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western leaders intensely debated the direction of the transatlantic alliance. Some in the Bill Clinton administration initially opposed expanding NATO, wary it would upset relations with President Boris Yeltsin’s fragile government in Russia and complicate other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as nuclear arms control. Others favored expansion as a way to extend NATO’s security umbrella to the east and consolidate democratic gains in the former Soviet bloc.

European members were also split on the issue. The United Kingdom feared NATO’s expansion would dilute the alliance, while France believed it would give NATO (and the United States) too much influence. Paris hoped to integrate former Soviet states via European institutions.

As a first step, Clinton chose to develop a new NATO initiative called the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which would be open to all former Warsaw Pact members, as well as non-European countries. Seeing this nonmembership framework as a means to allay some of Russia’s concerns about alliance expansion, NATO launched PfP at its annual summit in 1994. More than two dozen countries, including Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, joined in the following months.

However, Clinton soon began speaking publicly [PDF] about expanding NATO’s membership, saying in the Czech Republic just days after the launch of PfP that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” Yeltsin warned Western leaders at a conference later that year that “Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace.”

Beyond Collective Defense

Many U.S. officials felt that a post–Cold War vision for NATO needed to look beyond its core defense commitments—Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “an armed attack against one or more [member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”—and focus on confronting challenges outside its membership. “The common denominator of all the new security problems in Europe is that they all lie beyond NATO’s current borders,” said influential U.S. Senator Richard Lugar in a 1993 speech.

The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the onset of ethnic conflict tested the alliance on this point almost immediately. What began as a mission to impose a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved into a bombing campaign on Bosnian Serb forces that many military analysts say was essential to ending the conflict. In April 1994, during Operation Deny Flight, NATO conducted its first combat operations in its forty-year history, shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircraft.

NATO's Structure

Headquartered in Brussels, NATO is a consensus-based alliance in which decisions must be unanimous. However, individual states or subgroups of allies can initiate action outside NATO’s auspices. For instance, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom began policing a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone in Libya in early 2011 and, within days, transferred command of the operation to NATO once Turkey’s concerns had been allayed. Member states are not required to participate in every NATO operation; Germany and Poland declined to contribute directly to the campaign in Libya.

NATO’s military structure comprises two strategic commands: the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, located near Mons, Belgium, and the Allied Command Transformation, located in Norfolk, Virginia. The supreme allied commander Europe oversees all NATO military operations and is always a U.S. flag or general officer; U.S. Air Force General Tod D. Wolters currently holds this position. Although the alliance has an integrated command, most forces remain under their respective national authorities until NATO operations commence.

NATO’s secretary-general, Norwegian politician Jens Stoltenberg, is serving a second four-year term as the bloc’s chief administrator and international envoy. However, NATO leaders extended his service for one additional year (until September 2023) amid the war in Ukraine. The alliance’s principal political body is the North Atlantic Council, which is composed of high-level delegates from each member state.

### Perm: Do CP – 1AR

#### It’s a group of countries

Jacobson 12 Alice Jacobson, member of Task Force 2012, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, “Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring,” Chapter 13.3, *Can NATO React to the Arab Spring? Democracy, Human Rights, & the Rule of Law*, 2-27-2012, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/19668/J+Jones+Task+Force+Final+Report.pdf?sequence=1> /GoGreen!

Human rights violations as outlined in broad terms in the 2011 World Report, and pressure from organizations such as Human Rights Watch most certainly add to the international pressure on NATO to intervene. This has led to the discovery that military power may not be a useful instrument in dealing with specific country by country issues in the region. NATO is a group of democratic countries who in turn each have an individual agenda when dealing in the Middle East and North Africa, and are tied to the region by their oil dependency; but protection of human rights as justification for military intervention must be across the board or not at all. Military intervention in Libya was completed swiftly based largely on the economic incentives of NATO’s democratic powers, whereas in Syria, NATO has been immobilized as more people die everyday.

#### Contextual use proves

Alanis 22 Kaitlyn Alanis, McClatchy National Real-Time Reporter, graduate in journalism and agricultural communications, Kansas State University, “What is NATO, and what role will it play in Russia’s attack on Ukraine? 5 facts to know,” Miami Herald, 2-25-2022, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article258743163.html> /GoGreen!

WHAT IS NATO?

NATO is a group of 30 member countries that agree to work together to ensure the security of the Northern Atlantic area.

“NATO’s purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means,” according to its website. Politically, the alliance promotes democracy, and it allows its members to “consult and cooperate on defence and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict.”

### Perm: Do Both – 2AC

#### Perm: do both – plan’s just an offer, choice shields the net benefit

#### Counterplan alone does NOT spill-up – it collapses NATO – perm solves

--MDC = multinational defense cooperation

Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/why-wont-europeans-use-nato-and-the-eu/> /GoGreen!

Although regional MDCs have been proliferating and strengthening in Europe, they remain fragile and this fragility will have a significant impact on the landscape of European defence. The weakness of regional MDCs is that they are driven mostly by national Ministries of Defence and do not have a well-grounded, strategically sophisticated background for collaboration. Countries often co-operate on defence issues without defining their common foreign policy goals. This can undermine the raison d’être of defence cooperation, even in the short-term, and cause significant problems in situations where participating states of regional MDCs are divided on the necessity of military action.

Another difficulty for sub-regional MDCs is that although they face financial pressure to find multinational partners to mitigate the capability decline of European armed forces, they cannot develop these collaborations without significant political and social support. These problems of regional MDCs may have a negative impact on defence co-operation in NATO and the EU as well, because Ministries of Defence will be even less inclined to work together in large organisations if they cannot even succeed in smaller frameworks. However, if these difficulties can be overcome by certain regional MDCs, the participating states will have to bring their foreign policy goals closer to underpin their co-operation. Accordingly, emerging regional blocs may become more assertive in achieving their goals, and thus regional solidarity could replace transatlantic or pan-European solidarity in more and more cases. This may undermine the relevance of NATO and the EU, and result in a much weaker EU.

To avoid these outcomes, NATO and the EU have to pay more attention to the regional MDCs and must attempt to channel the results of regional MDCs into their processes as much as possible. NATO has a comparative advantage in this regard, as it possesses a much more sophisticated and effective defence planning system (NATO Defence Planning Process – NDPP) than the EU. The NDPP is not perfect, but it provides a flexible enough instrument to tackle multinational military collaborations as it has already done with multinational projects in the framework of the Smart Defence initiative.

NATO should therefore, via its NDPP, support and embed the projects of regional MDCs into its own processes and ensure that MDCs work to fulfil NATO commitments and contribute to the Level of Ambition of the Alliance. This way NATO could mitigate the chance of the development of regional interests in Europe and at the same time provide political impetus for regional MDCs to overcome the hardships of day-to-day practical collaboration.

For the last several years NATO and the EU have tried to push together countries ‘artificially’ to make them co-operate on certain capability areas. Yet, European nations created and reenergised regional MDCs. Thus, NATO should look to its other options and rather follow the ‘organic’ evolution of European military collaborations and channel that into its defence planning process.

### Perm: Do Both – 1AR

#### CP alone trades off with NATO – whether it solves or not

--MDC = multinational defense cooperation

Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/why-wont-europeans-use-nato-and-the-eu/> /GoGreen!

Instead of using NATO and EU institutional frameworks, European nations have recently established a series of new regional ‘multinational defence co-operations’ (MDCs) and reenergised old ones. Although policymakers and analysts support all kinds of defence co-operation, they have not taken into consideration the negative consequences of unstructured defence collaborations. For instance, if the emerging regional MDCs do not prove successful, they will hinder defence co-operation in Europe in general, including within NATO and the EU, as nations become even less willing to work with larger organisations where co-operation is slower and more complicated.

However, if these MDCs succeed, they are likely to create common views and interests among regional partners on defence issues, thereby strengthening regional bodies and weakening transatlantic ties and pan-European solidarity. Thus, NATO and the EU should revise their policies which attempt to foster defence co-operation based exclusively on common military capability requirements, and should instead focus on exploiting the changing European defence co-operation landscape by channelling regional MDCs into their planning systems.

#### Perception of using bilats to circumvent NATO snowballs

Tylaz 22 Tylaz, Professional News Platform, “Why does Russia not simply invade Ukraine and need to build a pretext?” Tylaz, 2-18-2022, <https://www.tylaz.net/2022/02/18/why-does-russia-not-simply-invade-ukraine-and-need-to-build-a-pretext/> /GoGreen!

How to “read” the Russian reference to the missile shield

Of course, in what Moscow proposes here, Romania is included – we can read the anti-missile shield between the lines quite obviously. And not because the Americans would like to withdraw it – it is an American-Romanian project, but it has been assimilated and legitimized by NATO decisions. Let it be clear, it is a NATO project, it is not a bilateral agreement, as I heard from a party in Romania, that we kissed the ring of the Americans in 2013 (allusion to Călin Georgescu, honorary president of AUR – no. ).

Here the issue is very clear: Vladimir Putin does not want to discuss arms control with the Americans, but political issues. Political issues, Americans say, are discussed in NATO, not bilaterally. Because if it is discussed bilaterally, in practice, the North Atlantic Organization, in one form or another, falls into disuse.

### AT: Spill-Up

#### NO spill-up – YES trade-off – it’s a serious threat to NATO broadly

Donaghy 16 Aaron Donaghy, Visiting Scholar 2016-2017 & EU Marie Curie Global Fellow, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, “Panel 3: Europe’s Security and Foreign Policy Challenges,” Summit on the Future of Europe 2016, Europe and the Forces of Disunion, Executive Summary, 2016, <https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/Event-Papers/Summit-2016-Executive-Summary-Final.pdf> /GoGreen!

Rawi Abdelal, Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management at Harvard Business School and Director of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, warned of the trend towards bilateralism at the expense of multilateralism. The ability of European institutions to multilateralize challenges was one of the foundations of its long history of success. Now, however, there is an increasing danger of the United States negotiating bilaterally rather than on collective terms (e.g. defense and trade arrangements), bypassing Brussels in the process. The spread of bilateralism is a growing threat to transatlantic security cooperation, particularly in lieu of recent Russian activities in what it sees as its sphere of influence. Abdelal points out, however, that Russia also has its weaknesses. Chief among them is its heavy dependence on the European market. He cites the example of Gazprom, the state-run gas company, whose supply of fuels to Europe provides Russia with roughly two-thirds of its government revenue.

#### Isolated instances of policy “uploading” does NOT equate to solvency at the level of the plan – “uploads” have been empirically superficial and strategically useless to NATO

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

Despite this impressive list, NATO’s partnership mechanisms are not currently achieving their full potential and are due for a rethink. Many major issues are being neglected. This is not to say that partners no longer play a role in NATO’s operations and priorities. On the contrary, some—such as Sweden and Finland— are about as closely integrated in NATO’s planning as they could possibly be short of membership. But, as is also true with Georgia and Ukraine, most of these activities take place in bilateral or trilateral formats, although these countries are also part of other, larger partnership frameworks.

This reality reveals some flaws in NATO’s partnership policy. There are not only redundancies, but many of the broader frameworks have lost momentum and purpose. Many formats lack clear processes and goals, lumping together diverse groups of nations that have very different hopes and expectations in how they engage with NATO. In addition, formats like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which aim to catalyze broader cooperation beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area, continue to fall short of their intended purpose and lack a clear agenda for the future. While these frameworks demonstrate their usefulness by building political ties and space for dialogue, they are less effective when it comes to driving actual outcomes that benefit NATO’s interests or strategy, or those of its partner countries.

### AT: NB – Cohesion – 2AC

#### Net benefit’s backwards – perception alone tanks cohesion

Economist 3 “European defence: Divide and fall,” The Economist, 10-23-2003, <https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/2155692-recklessness-both-sides-atlantic-threatening-undermine-nato-divide-and-fall> /GoGreen!

Are Europe and America having doubts about their decades-long habits of common defence? America's ambassador to NATO darkly describes the current spat between NATO and the European Union (and for that matter within the EU itself), over what military things Europeans might plot to do together and where they might plot them, as “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship”. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, who started the quarrel by announcing that the EU should build its own operational-planning headquarters in Tervuren, a previously inoffensive suburb of Brussels, claim that causing a rift in the alliance could not be further from their minds. But more is at stake than bricks and mortar. How the row is settled will affect the way Europe and America can work together in the future.

They have supposedly already agreed on many of the basics: that Europe's armies should boost their limited firepower, for example; and that the EU should be able to act independently of NATO in cases where the alliance, with right of first refusal, chooses not to be involved itself. Indeed a painstakingly worked-out formula, finalised in March, enables the EU to use NATO equipment for these sorts of military operations, as is already happening in the Lilliputian mission the Europeans have taken over from NATO in Macedonia. There is even general agreement that the EU should be able to plan for its own military operations.

The real disagreement is about how the Tervuren four want the EU to do that—in its own headquarters, entirely separate from NATO. And the Americans have been alarmed as much by the way the proposal came about as by its content: the four, all sceptics of the Iraq war, cooked it up at their own mini-summit in April, when tempers were still running high. Disparaged at the time as a “chocolate soldier” summit, given the limited military capabilities of its Belgian host, among others, the meeting nevertheless made the Americans worry that Europe's defence effort might start to evolve into a competitor to NATO, rather than as a complement to it. All the more so, as it fits President Jacques Chirac's recently expressed neo-Gaullist vision of a “multipolar” world, one in which Europe could potentially be as much America's rival as its ally.

Still more worrying, Britain's Tony Blair may have made concessions to the neo-Gaullists at a get-together with Mr Chirac and Germany's Gerhard Schröder last month. Perhaps to show goodwill in advance of the wrangling over the draft European Union constitution, perhaps to seem to distance himself a little from George Bush, Mr Blair was more hospitable than Britain had previously seemed to the notion of independent operational planning by the EU. He also appeared to agree that some EU members should be allowed to push ahead on defence without the rest, though he has been careful to insist that any advance party must be open to others to join. He is clear, too, that Europe's defence efforts must remain compatible with NATO's—and he has the support of a lot of other European governments in that. He has therefore ruled out setting up military shop in Tervuren. And he has so far shown no sign of giving way to those who want the new EU constitution to contain a mutual-defence clause, which could undermine NATO's status as the ultimate guarantor of Europe's security.

Friendly fire

Mr Blair is right. The EU can already plan its own military operations, whether using NATO kit (as in Macedonia), or that of France and Britain, its two most militarily capable nations. The EU's mission in Congo, for example, is being run from a French headquarters. Putting up a new building for such purposes, at Tervuren or anywhere else, makes no sense. If something more is needed, better—and safer—for the EU to do its operational planning at NATO's existing military headquarters at Mons, in Belgium. Both sets of planners will be calling on the same pool of soldiers, making co-ordination essential. And it is more soldiers, not more headquarters to order them about, that Europe needs. What is more, if an EU operation should ever go wrong, and NATO is called in to help, common procedures would put fewer soldiers' lives at risk.

The Americans, however, are also at fault. The Bush administration has itself recently seemed intent on dividing NATO into allies and irritants. This gives the impression that it prefers strong Europeans to a strong Europe. It wants well-armed countries with whom it can work bilaterally instead of turning first to NATO. What a pity if “friendly fire” were to fell what is still the most successful military alliance in history.

### AT: NB – Cohesion – 1AR

#### Even if bilateral provision is normal, their competition arg means they do NOT even bother consulting beforehand, which turns cohesion

Hopkinson 5 William Hopkinson, former visiting researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, read history at Pembroke College Cambridge, “The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States,” Naval War College Newport Papers 23, May 2005, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA433848.pdf> /GoGreen!

Even immediately following the attacks, when for the first time in its history NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, its mutual defense commitment, the United States preferred to deal with its allies bilaterally rather than through the alliance. As regards the actual conduct of operations in Afghanistan, it is understandable that the United States did not use alliance machinery; however, that it did not use NATO as a forum for consultation over what it saw (and sees) as the principal security issue confronting itself and others, and the one through which it appears or purports to view most international affairs, raised major questions about the role of the alliance.

### Deficit – Multilat Key

#### Multilat key – mere perception that the law doesn’t explicitly authorize it is sufficient to wreck solvency

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf> /GoGreen!

Three other limitations or gaps have been raised in numerous discussions with SC personnel in DoD. We indicated above that DoD has been limited in some authorities to working only with foreign forces associated with national defense agencies. Emerging transnational threats and mission areas require the ability to work with interior agency forces or other gendarme or civil authorities when their security forces retain primary responsibility for those mission areas or operate in close collaboration with MoDs. For example, in many cases, the ministry or department of interior is responsible for securing national infrastructure and cyber assets; of six countries CENTCOM officials are engaging on infrastructure security, only in Jordan is the military responsible for protecting the country’s infrastructure.66

A second gap in Title 10 authorities is in the flexibility for DoD to work with regional organizations rather than just bilaterally with national governments. Under Title 10, even regional programs (such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund [CTPF]) are implemented bilaterally with national governments. There are no mechanisms for training and equipping regional organizations.67 When this limitation is combined with the limitation on U.S. military engagement with non-MoD security forces, it inhibits the U.S. ability to facilitate coordination among agencies with similar responsibilities within and across partners to have regional effects and to address local security threats.68

Finally, while Section 1206 and the subsequent Section 2282 were designed to be a more rapid means of building partner capacity than traditional Title 22 authorities like FMF and FMS, even these programs take some 12-18 months to deliver equipment to partners. A number of SC stakeholders in DoD still perceive a need for more “timely assistance” to partners who require small amounts of support to recover or enhance existing capability of their “forces in the fight.”69 Currently, these stakeholders point out, a “pseudo-FMS” case for $10,000 in truck springs takes the same amount of time to process as a major item of equipment.70

Summary of DoD Perceptions of Title 10 SC Authorities

In sum, DoD has been able to achieve many of its SC objectives with the patchwork of Title 10 authorities, but the proliferation of authorities and the complexities they engender have rendered them exceedingly difficult to apply. As we have noted here and in previous research, authorities are not the only reason for the frustration expressed by SC personnel; internal processes, organizational relationships, programmatic requirements, and inadequate levels of funding have also created obstacles. But the existing catalog of Title 10 authorities in some ways drives or complicates these other factors when they present the challenges in planning and execution detailed above. What many in the DoD SC community perceive as a flawed legislative foundation has had a compounding impact on the administration and management of SC programs, systems, and processes.

#### Only NATO solves – superior legitimacy, crisis management, resourcing, political will, integration and socialization

Nunes 20 Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Head of the Research Centre and former Deputy Director of the National Defence Institute, Portugal, PhD Political Science, University of Twente, postdoc International Relations, University of Groningen, “Prospects for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation,” National Defence Institute, June 2020, <https://www.idn.gov.pt/pt/publicacoes/idncadernos/Documents/Texto%20integral/idncadernos_37.pdf> /GoGreen!

The development of this new European strategic approach reveals a constant tension between two political centres, within which engagement in collaborative crisis management can happen. That of Brussels, calling for further security and defence integration, while cooperating with NATO and that of capable and willing European member states interested in preserving their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. These developments towards what sometimes appears to generate conflicting courses of action, has produced a layered system where cooperation occurs in different configurations. These configurations coexist and sometimes compete with formal organizations such as the EU/CSDP and NATO and the cooperative framework that result from EU-NATO Joint Declarations of 2016 and 2018. This system of security governance is a three-layered system where multilateralism, minilateralism and strategic bilateralism coexist, allowing participants to accommodate goals, benefits and security practices that emanate at the EU and NATO level, with those driven by particular national interests.

Each serves a different collaborative purpose. Multilateralism20 in the framework of cooperative security arrangements comprehends a majority of participants in a given security regime21 for instance that of the UN, NATO or EU, leading to the development of formal and long-lasting cooperation and coordination among states and organizations. Conversely, minilateralism comprises a few like-minded and willing participants, with similar national interests and approaches to foreign and security policy, as well as identical operational output. Distinctive from multilateralism and minilateralism, “strategic bilateralism” (Renard 2016, p. 14) involves particular forms of selective engagement of strategically able and willing participants with self-interested motives in converging security views and policies, whether those are defence and security policies or security issue-based concerns such as terrorism, cyber or hybrid threats.

Being beyond the scope of this paper, these security configurations offers analytical space to empirical research allowing to test in which conditions, how this coexistence strengthens or conversely weakens cooperative security and how it impacts on EuroAtlantic security. The inclusion of a multilateralist focus in major political and strategic documents, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union 2003), the EU Global Strategy (High Representative 2016) and NATO Strategic Concept (North Atlantic Council 2010) is accompanied by references to a normative and ruled based multilateral stand, on which both the EU and NATO are founded and from which they draw legitimacy for their external action in crisis management and conflict resolution.

This constitutive base for common security and collective action has also been shaping the base for cooperative output between the two organizations, having the EU’s interpretation of multilateralism, a normative and regulative emphasis that binds individual to common interests and obligations, while promoting “issue-based engagements” (Council of the European Union 2019, § 8 and 9) preferred by Member States and partners. Since 2016, an officially assumed interest-based approach to security and defence can be identified in several EU documents, such as the EU Global Strategy, the European Commission statements on the launch of the European Defence Fund or in the process leading to the institutionalisation of a Directorate General for Defence. Such initiatives may also translate what seems to be a more strategic European approach to new concepts, such as resilience or ownership22, while “principled pragmatism” appears as the new guiding principle for common foreign, security and defence policy, to use the expression adopted by the EU Global Strategy itself.

In the EU context, this emerging security governance discourse and practice based on effective multilateralism seeks to help confirming the Union as a security provider. First, it legitimises and reiterates the international stand of the European Union through international law, on the base of values, but also of interests that constitute a given multilateral structure. Second, it informs a normative and regulative basis for internal and external relations of Member States by reducing the space between these two levels of security. Third, it sets a comprehensive platform of cooperative engagement to harmonize implementation of guidelines, to improve coordination and to enhance cooperation at different levels: the international, the regional and the local. Fourth, in those non-juridically binding policy domains or on those areas which fall outside the aquis communautaire, it offers the opportunity for willing compliance among Member States (Nunes 2018). Due to the EU institutional design, with multi-level decision making levels, complex formal decision-making structure and wide-ranging external relations, multilateralism offers a broader multi-layered and trans-sectoral scope for policy action. It comprehends diverse policy domains with security implications from crisis management to humanitarian and development aid, adding to security new themes such as cyberspace or climate change and making available different policy instruments, whether one refers to those of trade, foreign policy, security and more recently defence. The EU forms a regional order, within which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP constitute a security regime shared by Member States, where the EU leads various multilateral processes (Ujvari 2016, p. 2) from trade to development. In a European context, multilateralism also means a system of governance within which traditional actors such as the UN, NATO and African Union coexist with emergent actors like China or India or with decision-making frameworks23 such as the North Atlantic Council.

Multilateralism has been a cross cutting theme in the EU and NATO policy documents.24 Being suggested by some as hindering national interest, it is acknowledged by others as a prevailing governance system. This despite a tendency for bilateralization of policies, manifestation of preference for intergovernmental decision-making methods or regionalization of security and defence through minilateralism of security and defence initiatives, as explained further ahead. Multilateral platforms, such as NATO and the EU, favour jointness of action and harmonization of understandings on security. Despite the presence of other cooperative configurations, it is still a lasting method of cooperation in the euro-atlantic context for several reasons. First, it is likely to gain support for legitimacy reasons adding normative guidance and representativeness to security practice, due to the number of participants involved, serving both common and particular interests. In June 2019, the European Council Conclusions describes it as “the best way to advance national, as well as collective interests” (Council of the European Union 2019, § 2). Second, for reasons of self-regulation of security and defence relations among participants, predisposing them to self-restrain, as opposed to “more common unilateral and less restrained methods” (Jervis 1985, p. 59). Third, for facilitating ad hoc access to resources and security and defence goods, such as common or collective knowledge, expertise and capabilities.

The minilateralist configuration of security and defence cooperation is characterised by cooperative arrangements among like-minded countries, for instance in the EU case under the form of “Pooling & Sharing” initiatives or “Smart Defence” in the case of NATO, gathering strategically able countries. It may occur within the EU and NATO or outside them. Minilateralism means a “diplomatic process of a small group of interested parties working together to supplement or complement the activities of international organizations in tackling subjects deemed too complicated to be addressed appropriately at the multilateral level” (Moret 2016, p. 2). This means that being a more flexible configuration, than formal multilateral agreements, located within security and defence organizations, it may generate better adherence and compliance from interested participants. In the security and defence domain, minilateralism gathers politically willing, self-interested and militarily able actors in order to advance what Member States perceive to be more difficult to achieve within the binding framework of security and defence organizations. In the European context, minilateralist alternatives are not a novelty being envisaged (Nunes 2018, pp. 53-55) in the Lisbon Treaty through: the mechanism of “Enhanced Cooperation” (TEU Article 327) in the domain of the Union’s non-exclusive competences; through the 2017 Council Decision (Council Decision (CFSP), 2017/ 2315),which set forward a Permanent Structured Cooperation among willing and able Member States and through the provision of a “Framework Nation” concept, TEU Article 43 (1), through which the Union will retain political control and strategic direction, while entrusting “specific responsibilities” or tasks to a Member State in the context of a EU-led missions and operations.25 In operational terms, minilateralism translates into a process of aggregated and shared capabilities, as referred earlier in the context of “Pooling & Sharing” or NATO’s “Smart Defence”.

In NATO’s case, due to its issue specific nature, minilateralism is invoked in a different manner. It describes a configuration meant to address transnational military and non-military challenges from stabilisation operations to counter cyber and hybrid threats, often positioned at the upper end of defence tasks due to its operational demands. It can also adopt the format of coalitions of the willing26 where some, but not all, of the Alliance members engage in the pursuit of security and defence goals.27 In this case, it serves the purpose of a more rapid response to threats, with less formal legal boundaries and complex decision-making procedures derived from international law, as those mandatory to the United Nations and EU led-operations or from the constitutive norms of the Washington Treaty, to which the Alliance abides by when acting collectively.

Changes in the nature of security, the transnational consequences of insecurity and the growing selective interdependence of interests among security actors led to a renewed interest in minilateralism. Due to the fact it gathers a smaller number of participants, it is better able to promote convergence of security interests and approaches, to accelerate responses to crises and to improve force generation, thus reducing the impact of security dilemmas, as perceived by states and security communities (Nunes 2017a, p. 18). This is even more relevant in complex security contexts, where different interests and preferences prevail in the face of multiple security challenges and in times of scarce resources.

The “strategic bilateralism”28 although it may occur within multilateral structures, such as international organizations, it also evolves outside the intergovernmental structures of the EU crisis management setting and that of the Alliance’s collective defence. In these cases, international and regional institutions may offer what Renard notes (2016, p. 31) as the role of “framing and institutionalizing cooperation (…) and occasionally in complementing member States, rather than substituting for them”. More often this cooperative configuration denotes a will, as in the case of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada and the United States to favour agreements at bilateral level that safeguard traditional foreign policy interests, outside and without the scrutiny of multilateral fora. Mattelaer (2019, p. 13) considers that the “prominence of bilateral diplomacy represents a symptom rather than a cause of change in the international system”. The revival of bilateral diplomacy can be observed in a wide variety of formats from the formality of the Lancaster House Treaty between Great Britain and France,29 following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty a year earlier30 to the launch in June 2018 of the French led European Intervention Initiative31 or the Franco-Danish Defence Cooperation, known as the European Initiative2 (EI2)32 that followed the Council Decision of 2017, establishing the first EU Council Decision initiative on Permanent Structured Cooperation. The EI2 enabled Denmark to contribute to European security and defence, outside the PESCO arrangement.33 Lastly, the Achen Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration, signed on the 22 January 201934 through which the two countries agreed to “deepen their cooperation in matters of foreign policy, defence, external and internal security and development, while striving to strengthen Europe’s ability to act autonomously” (Aachen Treaty, 2019, Article 3). Although these initiatives have been agreed outside the European Union and NATO they aim at strengthening them, as referred in the preamble or provisions foresee in those declarations, while furthering the specific interests and preferences of contracting parts.

Being a common practice in international affairs, these three examples: the Lancaster House Treaty, the European Intervention Initiative35 and the Aachen Treaty36 occur in time, almost simultaneously to other initiatives agreed with the aim to deepen European security and defence cooperation, such as PESCO, CARD, the European Defence Fund and the setup of a DG Defence within the European Commission. This does not necessarily mean distrust by Member States on the political strength, binding nature or operational output of security and defence initiatives launched within the European Union. Strategic bilateralism supplement and is even “conducive to stronger multilateral cooperation” (Grevi 2012, p. 16). It may suggest that multilateral initiatives agreed in intergovernmental fora, only some of which legally binding like PESCO and with the regulative and financial weigh of the European Commission, such as the European Defence Fund, do not exclude the necessity of alternative cooperative configurations, capacities and operational output that multilateral institutions are unable, or unwilling, to deliver as a whole, for reasons of political interest, contextual opportunity and availability of military and non-military resources.

4. Contexts of Opportunity for EU-NATO Cooperation

The point of debate on capability gap still holds true, whether when comparing defence expenditures among the EU NATO member states in the Alliance context, Europe as a whole or between Europe and the United States.37

Twenty years later, the American political and very public discourse calling for greater strategic responsibility by European allies, coincided with the European Union’s claim for more strategic autonomy, following the presentation of the European Global Strategy, the launch of several European cooperative endeavours38 and the development of several bilateral security and defence initiatives, led by strategically strong EU member states.39

In 2016 the lack of formal endorsement of NATO’s collective defence by the President of the United States was aggravated by the doubts casted over the ability of European allies to allocate resources and commit to defence in the transatlantic context. This caused a perception of political, diplomatic and strategic “devaluation of the alliance”, in the sense attributed by Glen Snyder (1984, p. 467) and posed self-interested conditionalities to allies, beyond the 2% of defence spending target. Although, as Snyder (1984, p. 491) years earlier accurately assessed, the European allies should avoid the “risk of entrapment (consisting of) troop withdrawals, American downgrading of the priority of European defence in favour of other areas such as the Persian Gulf, or a further drift to unilateralism”40. These were exactly some of the decisions adopted and initiatives taken by President Trump, as from the earlier years of his presidency. In 2019, during the Munich Security Conference41 former Vice President Joseph Biden, and a potential running candidate for the Democratic Party in the 2020 Presidential election, did reiterate full support to NATO and to its allies conveying a firm belief in the principle of collective defence. This position was supported by the majority of the forty-five democratic senators in the United States Senate, by various senior military representatives at the Department of Defense, at the Pentagon and senior diplomats and officials in Brussels, proving different perceptions within the American political establishment. Despite the rhetoric, the US has been increasing its commitment to Europe’s eastern flank, as the account by the Department of Defense Budget on the European Deterrence Initiative demonstrates.42

It was in a political environment of mutual political distrust, rhetorical and diplomatic controversy, of strained relations between Washington and most European capitals, of fears of rising nationalism in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Hungary and the announced withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, that a second attempt43 to formally enhance EU-NATO cooperation took place.

Despite the instability felt in Europe’s neighbourhood and the destabilizing effects caused by the consecutive interventions in Middle East, by the regime change in Libya and by the course of American and Russian foreign policy, the European and euroatlantic institutions proved resilient44 to contingencies sourced in the personality of national decision-makers and on the hindrances of party politics.

A realization that the EU-NATO cooperation was an imperative followed two major challenges to transatlantic unity. On the one hand, the coalition force that intervene in Kosovo (North Atlantic Council 1999a and 1999b) with NATO, despite the absence of a United Nations mandate. On the other, the American intervention in Afghanistan, at a time when the United States declined to accept the possibility to invoke Article 5, in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 200145.

The 2003 EU-NATO Declaration46 paved the way to the so-called development of a “strategic partnership” (Renard 2016b) between the EU and NATO. This led to the Berlin Plus agreement, opening the opportunity to the European Union to use NATO’s command and control collective structure and to institutionalise forms of cooperation and political consultation between the two organizations in the field of crisis management and capability development on fight against terrorism, organized crime and cybersecurity.

In 2016, the need to foster better EU and NATO cooperation was in part a reaction to two exogenous events. On the one hand, the potential wearing down of transatlantic relations in the face of growing defence spending, following the unilateral involvement of some allied countries in the Syrian conflict and in military operations in the context of fight against ISIS. On the other, due to a continuous ambivalence in relations between the United States, the EU and NATO sourced in the political and strategic narrative of American administrations against the development of European defence integration. The notion of European Security and Defence Identity or that of a NATO’s European pillar47 prevailed over a more autonomous European defence, while the very same administrations pressed for a more independent operational output of European allies, higher defence spending and stronger commitment of Europeans to NATO’s military operations.

Despite the potential for disagreement between the two organizations, contextual events did prove their adaptability to the changing strategic environment. NATO evolved from out-of-area to a new military stance with the return to European and transatlantic core defence functions, after the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The EU/CSDP, although without abandoning its security interests towards the near neighbourhood, turned its security focus to the protection of its citizens, to a more efficient response to external crises and called for better commitment towards regional security and capacity building of partners, leading to stronger resilience and committed ownership.48 These almost simultaneous processes of adaptation were accompanied by a closer relation among allies, centred on the principle of “effective multilateralism” and strategic complementarity, contradicting the idea of competition and duplication between the two organizations. This is a reserve frequently expressed among policy makers and analysts, although it has been formally addressed and solved within both organizations.

From an early stage, EU actors have denied the idea of competing or duplicating security and defence projects by stating that CSDP will act “where NATO as a whole is not or does not wish to get involved”, a concern repeatedly underlined since the 2001 Laeken EU Council and reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). More recently a statement adopted by the European Defence Agency assured that “no capacity duplication with other institutions such as NATO” would happen, stressing that PESCO would develop as a “coherent full spectrum force package” (EDA 2018, p. 4) in complementarity with NATO. This intention was also reiterated by the “Implementation Plan for Security and Defence”, by the “European Defence Action Plan” and by the “Notification letter on PESCO to the Council and High Representative”. This concern with avoiding the idea of duplication is also mirrored at the bilateral level among those which are strategically more capable. Recent agreements between actors such as France and Germany, as in the case of the Achen Treaty in its Article 4, emphasises that the bilateral commitment to reinforce cooperation between France and Germany, regarding European security and defence is taken “In light of their obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949 and of Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007 amending the Treaty on European Union” (Achen Treaty, 2019, Article 4 (1)) formally refuting any interpretations on duplication.

In July 2016, in Warsaw, the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and NATO’s Secretary General signed an EU-NATO Joint Declaration on how to further cooperation between the two organizations. This initiative was followed in December, of the same year, by an agreement on a common set of proposals to implement “EU-NATO Joint Declaration” (2016) by endorsing 42 proposals in the 7 areas agreed: defence capabilities; capacity building; industry and research; cyber security; hybrid threats, operational cooperation and exercises. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called the 2016 agreement “a milestone in our relations,” recognising that “neither organisation has the full range of tools” to address new security and defence challenges unilaterally (NATO Meeting Ministers of Foreign Affairs 2016).

In December 2017 the Council of the European Union49 would underline the necessity to implement the Joint Declaration reinforcing cooperation at the strategic and operational levels between the EU and NATO. A particular interest was placed on the collaboration between the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats¸ staff level cooperation on threat assessment regarding terrorism and on how to counter terrorist threats. The identification of gender indicators and assessments on how they could improve situational awareness, in support of the UNSCR 1325 agreed in 2000, were also addressed. It was agreed to promote EU and NATO staff presence in advisory and preparedness bodies for missions of the respective organizations and better coordination of EU-NATO exercises.

In 2018 a EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed reiterating the interest and noting the progress achieved on what regards military mobility, counter-terrorism, cyber security, hybrid threats, resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear related risks and promoting the women, peace and security agenda. This was followed by the attendance of the new High Representative Josep Borrell to NATO Defence Ministerial meeting. At the operational level there is a continuous cooperative effort in the Aegean Sea, where NATO has six ships helping to implement the agreement between the EU and Turkey on the refugee crisis, as well as support to Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean.50 This measures and actions reflect the particular security and defence concerns of both organizations and how NATO and the EU may contribute to mitigate them. Coherence, complementarity and interoperability remain the three main drivers for EU-NATO cooperation and the only acceptable and feasible in times of limited budgets and increasing new challenges to security and defence.

However, the cumulative nature of the process of cooperation that result from the EU-NATO Joint Declarations cooperation, rather than phased and incremental, may be counterproductive for three reasons. First, for reasons of capacity availability and funding. Second due to the length of national legislative cycles, which may limit the political willingness of Member States to pursue, in a sustainable manner, new cooperative engagements once the political cycle has changed. Third, and as Verbeke notes (2017, p. 5), structural projects such as those related with states “Long term strategic interests or investments (such as energy infrastructure or major defence platforms) are neglected in favour of short-term tactical advantages or pet projects”. This trend may compromise the binding effect of more structural commitments, agreed within multilateral arrangements, such as NATO and the EU.

Each Member State encloses very specific political, strategic, diplomatic and security cultures, distinct historical legacies and operational output. This may be determinant on how security and defence cooperation moves forward and how Member States and participant states accommodate alternative frameworks in multilateral, minilateral and bilateral settings, adjusting to new processes of security governance. Connected societies are as prone to accountability as they are to the immediacy of results, a demand that fits poorly to the required long-term test to which regional and international cooperation is exposed to, in order to prove resilience to external challenges and efficient output in the face of change.

5. Advantages of EU-NATO Cooperation

Despite considerable improvements leading to better institutionalization of cooperation, between the EU and NATO, academic and policy debates are still focused on traditional divides, which can be systematized in two approaches: on how to address and manage security problems. Those that, in the words of Glenn Snyder (1984:489), postulate the effectiveness of “toughness and confrontation” and those who value a “strategy of conciliation”. This divide has been characterising the cooperative stance between the two organizations for decades and those of Member States foreign relations. To a certain extent, this dichotomy affects both the analytical and strategic approach, when addressing Euro-Atlantic security and defence relations. This varies from a persistent concern with the division of strategic work among European and non-European allies (Yost, 2000 and 2007); to the problem of strategic and financial burden sharing (Kivimäki 2019; Jakobsen 2018; National Defence Strategy 2018) and to the conditionality that results in the fact European defence will only be welcomed by the United States and by the more Atlanticist allies, if and when it strengthens NATO (Brattberg 2018; BillonGalland and Thomson 2018; Leonard and Shapiro 2019). The specific concern with division of strategic work in a NATO context and the reluctance of some Member States to embrace role specialisation of certain security and defence tasks at the European level, has evolved into a new perception on the disagreements registered among allies on the Alliance collective share of risks and defence expenses versus selective common investments in European security and defence, through Permanent Structured Cooperation. The two moments of strategic strain in 2003 and 2016, did not impair Euro-Atlantic cooperation and despite concerns with duplication and competition, developments have shown that complementarity between the two organizations is valued the most.51

Several circumstances have been enabling better opportunities for cooperation between the EU and NATO. First, contextual related reasons such as the emergence of hybrid threats in the Eastern Europe, the threat of potential and actual external interferences on allied countries internal affairs, the consequences of the refugee crisis over European unity and the uncertainties caused by the British referendum.52 To this already long list, one must add the internal and regional consequences of the conflict in Syria, the position of President Donald Trump regarding NATO and the EU creating a perception of existential threat the long and well succeed transatlantic alliance. On the one hand, it led to the claim that Europe should aim at a stronger role in the security and defence of Europe. On the other, that that strengthened position would only be supported if and when it reinforced NATO. In the face of current security challenges, unforeseeable outcomes of insecurity, limited resources and greater interdependency related with the consequences of uncertainty, the development of cooperation, rather than competition, is an expected outcome for relations among states and within international organizations. The deterioration of insecurity in North Africa, following the collapse of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, the downfall of the so called Islamic state in the Middle East, the consequences of revisionist foreign policies and the spread of terrorist acts in Europe point to the diversity of sources of insecurity and to the necessity for a more efficient and distinct form of security and defence cooperation53, of which military cooperation is just a part. Closer functional cooperation between the EU and NATO may help to better deal with the uncertainties of systemic insecurity in Eastern Europe and on the South and South-eastern rim of the Mediterranean, offering the opportunity to safeguard distinct national and international security interests. Decision makers and international bureaucracies should endorse what Member States do better, whether that is crisis response or conflict management, fight against terrorism, maritime security and mitigation of cyber and hybrid threats, according to different strategic cultures and interests, while fostering ownership and cooperation in response to security challenges.

Second, collaborative practice strives better in institutional environments where international socialization among security and defence actors is high. In strongly connected structures political, public scrutiny may turn collaborative practice into an instrument that adds legitimacy, better mobilizes public and political will and creates more favourable conditions to resource security and defence agencies, such as NATO and the EU-CSDP. NATO and the EU gather relevant strategic players, share a high degree of membership overlap and their international security mandates have a specific focus on European security and defence interests. This brings into Euro-Atlantic collaborative practice both an element of representativeness of interests and a dimension of legitimacy.

Third, power shifts in the international system may lead to changes in the nature of security, opening up a new range of tasks for international organizations beyond their original mandate, from military missions to operations-other-than-war, to humanitarian relief, organized crime eradication and disaster relief. This is reflected in new security tasks, but also in new mobilizing arguments in the way security roles are performed, such as preventive security, pre-emptive military action, mitigation of hybrid threats and crisis response, rather than classical military offensive, an option that governments and public opinions appear to be less inclined to support. New role prescriptions not only demand new military and non-military responses, but also a security discourse that appeals to cooperative action, combining international law, centred on value-based principles and arguments that serve national interests, while suggesting further functional integration on security and defence. Role specialisation may be an “asset” on demand given that not all armed and security forces can afford to have the full spectrum of capabilities required to mitigate current challenges and threats.

The institutionalisation of new forms of cooperative security, as established between the EU-NATO, by the corresponding declarations on cooperation of 2003, 2016 and 2018, underline the need to share risks and responsibilities in specific security levels, notably in the context of hybrid threats, maritime security to mitigate illegal trafficking of human beings and search and rescue of irregular migrants at sea. A good example of EU-NATO cooperation at the operational level was developed in the Horn of Africa to counter maritime piracy54, together with missions in land with the aim to develop capacity building on maritime security, in coastal areas in the region. Other cooperative efforts were developed in 2016, through Operation Sophia, with the aim to lessen the challenges posed by the refugee crisis in the Aegean Sea, in combination with the support given to the Turkish and Greek authorities and the support made available by EU FRONTEX. In each of these missions and operations, both NATO and the EU moved from traditional security and defence in the far border, to counter-piracy and irregular migration in the near border.

The fourth advantage of enhancing security and defence cooperation between the EU and NATO results from the fact that, organizations and the states that incorporate them commit to cooperative frameworks for reasons of easier access to specialized knowledge, information and resources. Currently, the EU as already access to command and planning structures of NATO, under the Berlin Plus agreement and in the future it can be envisaged an eventual access of NATO to the EU-CSDP specific civilian proficiencies of the European crisis response toolkit. The development of both the EU CSDP Civilian Compact (Council of the European Union 2018) and the projects developed under Permanent Structured Cooperation (Council Decision 2017) may contribute to develop European actors roles, knowledge and experience on civilian crisis management, while supplementing the amount of resources needed among participant states in crisis prevention, conflict resolution and in post-conflict situations.

For cooperation to happen political will and trust must be present. These conditions are not mere technical arrangements, sometimes not even financial ones, they are a choice that shapes the opportunity to engage collective. The participation in new cooperative security frameworks in “conditions of confidence building, transparency, information availability and knowledge” (Nunes 2006, p. 89), enable institutional mimetism to strive among organizations, thus facilitating cooperation or conversely creating a situation of perceived competition for mandates and resources. In the case of NATO, there is a growing appeal among allies for it to perform civilian security tasks for which the Alliance was not originally created, as a political and military organization. In the case of EU-CSDP, one observes an increasing institutionalization of conditions aiming at a better operational deliver, following the approval of a Security and Defence Action Plan (European Council 2016) and the agreement on Permanent Structured Cooperation.55

Lastly, the fact both NATO and the EU are politically integrated and highly socialised organizations, bound by similar norms and interests, makes political cooperation an opportunity and the prospect of more efficient operational collective engagement more likely. Cooperation is expected to work better in an interdependent security environment, where multiple memberships to organizations are present and where resources scarcity or uneven distribution of resources occurs turning cooperation into a more advantageous and less costly alternative.

### Deficit – Norm-Setting

#### Counterplan forfeits NATO’s norm-setting power

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

But ad hoc approaches also pose challenges to organizations like NATO. Madeleine Albright warned against the “three Ds” in the 1990s when she highlighted the risks of de-linking from, or duplicating NATO efforts, as well as discriminating among members.24 These issues remain an important concern—particularly in U.S. policy discussions – when it comes to more recent ad hoc or minilateral formats focused on European defense. A more concerted NATO role in guiding flexible efforts within the alliance could help address this concern to minimize redundancies and buttress cohesion.

NATO should work as much as possible with members and partners to ensure minilateral formats complement, rather than compete with, the alliance. Moreover, NATO should consider how it can more effectively apply the lessons of these formats to its partnership policy to craft a more flexible approach. This includes lessons from previous efforts to create flexible formats within the alliance.

There are few metrics to evaluate a model’s success. In many ways, weighing the differences between minilateral arrangements outside larger multilateral frameworks and flexible formats inside them is tantamount to comparing apples and oranges. But there are a few factors that are instructive, including mutual interest in cooperation, shared threat perceptions and security priorities (which are often aligned with geographic location), and a high level of ambition of all involved participants. Moreover, on a procedural level, clear, defined goals and a focus on outputs, coupled with regular consultations, can help drive success. Ad hoc formats with lean and focused structures that are built around voluntary participation allow for quicker responses—especially in crisis situations—but they may be less suited to driving and verifying success on long term deliverables and capability goals.

Flexible formats embedded within NATO, like the FNC and the NATO+N model, or alongside NATO in the case of PESCO can increase agility for member and partner cooperation. But the diminishing enthusiasm around the German FNC and challenges surrounding PESCO funding indicate continued hurdles. The NATO+N model has proven effective in engaging two or three partners around common regional security challenges (for example, NATO members, Finland, and Sweden). Yet, its limits risk a default bilateralization or trilateralization of NATO’s engagement with partners and may fail to leverage a broader capacity of partnerships.

In its effort to create greater political cohesion in Euro-Atlantic defense, NATO cannot ignore the application and improvement of its flexible partnership engagement. The tendency of NATO members and partners to participate in various minilateral formats has significant implications. If NATO cannot figure out how to engage partners more effectively and flexibly, they and members may increasingly be inclined to engage in various minilateral formats rather than NATO or simply pursue bilateral ties. In this context, NATO partnerships could end up as little more than a “talk shop,” forfeiting the alliance’s agenda-setting power.

### Deficit – Political Sustainability

#### Counterplan tanks public support for NATO – key to sustain U.S. membership

Skidmore 12 David Skidmore, Drake University, “The Obama Presidency and US Foreign Policy: Where’s the Multilateralism?” International Studies Perspectives, no.13, 2012, pp.43-64, DOI 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00454.x /GoGreen!

Policymakers tend to assume that foreign aid can attract public support only to the extent that it is perceived to serve narrowly focused national interests. Yet, the 1995 survey found that humanitarian rationales for aid attracted the strongest support. Americans were less inclined to favor aid programs designed to reward friendly countries or to win economic benefits for US business. Military aid was also quite unpopular. But majorities ranging from 74% to 91% wanted to maintain or increase aid devoted to ends such as child survival, humanitarian relief, repairing the environment, family planning, and long-term economic development. There existed strong support for targeting aid toward the poorest countries. Americans were skeptical, however, that aid actually reaches those who need it or achieves humanitarian aims. Roughly 80% of respondents believed that too much aid went to undemocratic regimes, that aid is plagued by waste and corruption, and that foreign assistance programs often foster dependence on the part of recipients.11

One obvious implication of these findings is that advocates for increased foreign aid would do well to correct public misperceptions that the United States is bearing a disproportionate burden as compared with other aid-giving countries. Yet, research conducted by the Aspen Institute suggests that the problem is more complicated: ‘‘When informants were confronted with such information, they showed momentary surprise, and then reverted to their old patterns of reasoning. A core rule of strategic frame analysis is at play here: if the facts don’t fit the frame, it is the facts that are rejected, not the frame’’ (Bales 2001:8).

A better strategy for mobilizing public support for aid is to emphasize America’s shared responsibility to respond to human suffering in concert with others. This approach shifts the focus from interests to values and assures members of the public that the burden is not borne by the United States alone. Funneling increasing proportions of US aid through bilateral rather than multilateral mechanisms actually undercuts the appeal of aid by reinforcing erroneous perceptions that America is on its own when it comes to fighting hunger, disease, and natural disasters. Placing aid within a multilateral context, by contrast, highlights the contributions of other states. A 2010 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that only 8% supported the view that the United States should continue to serve as the pre-eminent leader in responding to international problems. On the other hand, only 19% felt that the United States should withdraw from efforts to solve most international problems. Instead, a large majority—71%—adopted the view that the United States should do its share in cooperation with other countries.

More generally, public support for multilateral engagement rises when the domestic audience is primed through exposure to cooperative frames. Framing involves the use of metaphors, analogies, and symbols that serve to cue up desired associations among audience members with respect to a given issue. Research conducted by the Aspen Institute has found that, in comparisons with a control group, respondent attitudes toward multilateral engagement abroad shifted in a positive direction when previously exposed to statements stressing interdependence, partnership, and shared norms among states and societies. This research also suggested that policymakers must convince members of the public that global problems are not intractable but instead amenable to feasible solutions.

Despite recent survey results pointing to declining support for international engagement, the challenge for policymakers who seek to overcome domestic obstacles to international engagement is less to expand the breadth of public support for such initiatives than to deepen the salience of multilateralism among members of the public. Passive and shallow majorities in favor of international cooperation do little to counter the influence of mobilized interests who oppose multilateral engagement or to overcome misperceptions among politicians who mistakenly read the public as unilateralist. A president seeking domestic support for a multilateral agenda in US foreign policy must therefore craft a compelling narrative that serves to awaken and mobilize the latent public support that has to date remained dormant and underutilized.

### T/N – Miscalc

#### Counterplan’s signal of subregional fragmentation causes miscalc – escalates to global war

Richter 17 Wolfgang Richter, (Colonel ret.) Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, Research Group on Security Politics, “Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of Conventional Arms Control,” Deep Cuts Working Paper No.11, September 2017, <https://deepcuts.org/images/PDF/DeepCuts_WP11_Richter.pdf> /GoGreen!

No matter how one might assess sub-regional force balances, the assumption that an aggression against a NATO ally could be limited to a sub-regional war seems flawed. Nevertheless, a narrow focus on sub-regional Russian geographical advantages as to quick movements of land forces has been shaping the western discussion on military response options.

But launching a deliberate major aggression against an alliance that disposes at superior conventional forces and positive security guarantees by nuclear powers would entail incalculable risks of a global war. This is not a plausible scenario.

This is why the German government and western European allies during the Warsaw NATO Summit7 in July 2016 insisted that the purpose of an enhanced forward presence is a limited one: It aims at sending a strategic signal that the alliance cannot be divided rather than trying to engage in an arms race to win sub-regional military superiority. Consequently, they rejected requests to station several heavy brigades and to build-up new military frontlines in contradiction to the restraint commitment enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997.8

The true core of the issue is that changing force postures and military doctrines, forward deployment of new units and the increase of military activities such as large scale manoeuvres, snap exercises without prior notification and near border reconnaissance flights are a matter of great concern, especially if accompanied by dangerous brinkmanship which can spin out of control. This concern is all the more relevant since a sense of a new confrontation is dominating political discourses in East and West and the narratives on the root causes of conflict have developed in opposite and incompatible directions.

#### It’s the nightmare scenario

Hyde-Price 12 Adrian Hyde-Price, Professor of International Politics at the University of Bath, “The Future of the European Security System,” Studia Diplomatica, 65(1), 2012, pp.127-139, JSTOR /GoGreen!

The final scenario envisages a more organic and fluid European security system, evolving without the conscious architectural design of the first three models, and taking shape through a process of mutual give and take. It is a model of a Europe of independent nation-states, defending their national interests but cooperating together for mutual benefit, without attempting to create a hierarchical security architecture or overarching multilateral governance. In this scenario, European security would involve shifting patterns of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral cooperation, with ad hoc groupings (‘coalitions of the willing’) forming to deal with specific problems, and a ‘variable geometry’ of security cooperation developing across the continent. This is a vision of Europe that lacks many committed advocates; indeed, it is one which is widely viewed as the nightmare scenario, involving a ‘renationalisation’ of security policy, multipolar instability, and a situation in which – in Thucydides words – the strong do what they will, and the weak do what they must.